TY  - JOUR
TI  - Cooperation and punishment in public goods experiments
T2  - American Economic Review
IS  - 4
AB  - This paper shows experimentally that there is a widespread 
willingness of cooperators to punish free-riders. Results indicate 
that this holds true even if punishment is costly and does not 
provide any material benefits for the punisher. In addition, evidence 
is provided that free-riders are punished the more heavily the more 
they deviate from the cooperation levels of the cooperators. 
AU  - Fehr, Ernst
AU  - Gachter, Simon
UR  - http://ecsocman.hse.ru/text/16775244/
PY  - 2000
SP  - 980-994
M2  - 980
VL  - 90
SN  - 
N1  - 
LA  - EN
CY  - 
PB  - 
M3  - 
LB  - 
VL  - 
ER  -