@ARTICLE{16802857_1997,
author = {Vincent, Daniel R. and McAfee, R. Preston},
keywords = {asymmetric information, auction theory, perfect Bayesian equilibrium, аукцион, математическое моделирование, равновесие в игре, теория аукционов, экономическое поведение},
title = {Sequentially Optimal Auctions},
journal = {Games and Economic Behavior},
year = {1997},
month = {},
volume = {18},
number = {2},
pages = {},
url = {http://ecsocman.hse.ru/text/16802857/},
publisher = {},
language = {ru},
abstract = {We examine equlibria in sequential auctions where a seller can post a
reserve price but, if the auction fails to result in a sale, can
commit keeping the object off the market only for an exogenously
fixed period of time. We restrict attention to enviornments where
bidders have independent private values and where the support of the
bidder types lies strictly above the valuation of the seller. In the
case where the seller sells by second price auction in each period,
there is a unique perfect Bayesian equilbrium. A form of revenue
equivalence is shown. There exists a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of
repeated first price auctions with the feature that in every period,
the seller's expected revenue from the continuation is the same in
either auction mechanism. As the length of time the seller can commit
to keeping the object off the market goes to zero, seller expected
revenues converge to those of a static auction with no reserve price.
As the number of bidders becomes large, the seller expected revenue
approaches the revenue from an optimal static auction. We also
characterize a parametrized auction game in which the simple
equilibrium reserve price policy of the seller mirrors a policy
commonly used by many auctioneers. },
annote = {We examine equlibria in sequential auctions where a seller can post a
reserve price but, if the auction fails to result in a sale, can
commit keeping the object off the market only for an exogenously
fixed period of time. We restrict attention to enviornments where
bidders have independent private values and where the support of the
bidder types lies strictly above the valuation of the seller. In the
case where the seller sells by second price auction in each period,
there is a unique perfect Bayesian equilbrium. A form of revenue
equivalence is shown. There exists a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of
repeated first price auctions with the feature that in every period,
the seller's expected revenue from the continuation is the same in
either auction mechanism. As the length of time the seller can commit
to keeping the object off the market goes to zero, seller expected
revenues converge to those of a static auction with no reserve price.
As the number of bidders becomes large, the seller expected revenue
approaches the revenue from an optimal static auction. We also
characterize a parametrized auction game in which the simple
equilibrium reserve price policy of the seller mirrors a policy
commonly used by many auctioneers. }
}