@ARTICLE{17484048_2004,
author = {Myatt, David and Wallace, Chris C.},
keywords = {adaptive dynamics, equilibrium selection, evolution, payoff idiosyncrasy, адаптивная игра, эволюция},
title = {Adaptive Play by Idiosyncratic Agents},
journal = {Games and Economic Behavior},
year = {2004},
month = {},
volume = {48},
number = {1},
pages = {124-138},
url = {http://ecsocman.hse.ru/text/17484048/},
publisher = {},
language = {ru},
abstract = {Equilibrium selection in coordination games has generated a large
literature. Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) and Young (1993) studied
dynamic models of aggregate behaviour in which agents choose best
responses to observations of population play. Crucially, infrequent
mistakes (`mutations`) allow agents to take actions contrary to
current trends and prevent initial configurations from determining
long run play. An alternative approach is offered here: Harsanyian
trembles are added to agents` payoffs so that with some probability
it is optimal to act against the flow of play. The long run
distribution of population behaviour is characterised - modes
correspond to stable Bayesian Nash equilibria. Allowing the variance
of payoff trembles to vanish, via a purification process, a single
equilibrium is played almost always in the long run. Kandori et al
and Young show that the number of contrarian actions required to
escape an equilibrium determines selection; here, the likelihood that
such actions are taken is of equal importance. },
annote = {Equilibrium selection in coordination games has generated a large
literature. Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) and Young (1993) studied
dynamic models of aggregate behaviour in which agents choose best
responses to observations of population play. Crucially, infrequent
mistakes (`mutations`) allow agents to take actions contrary to
current trends and prevent initial configurations from determining
long run play. An alternative approach is offered here: Harsanyian
trembles are added to agents` payoffs so that with some probability
it is optimal to act against the flow of play. The long run
distribution of population behaviour is characterised - modes
correspond to stable Bayesian Nash equilibria. Allowing the variance
of payoff trembles to vanish, via a purification process, a single
equilibrium is played almost always in the long run. Kandori et al
and Young show that the number of contrarian actions required to
escape an equilibrium determines selection; here, the likelihood that
such actions are taken is of equal importance. }
}