@ARTICLE{18998147_1990,
author = {Hillas, John},
keywords = {equilibrium selection, Nash equilibrium, математическое моделирование, равновесие по Нэшу, теория игр, экономическое поведение},
title = {On the Definition of the Strategic Stability of Equilibria},
journal = {Econometrica},
year = {1990},
month = {},
volume = {58},
number = {6},
pages = {1365-1390},
url = {http://ecsocman.hse.ru/text/18998147/},
publisher = {},
language = {ru},
abstract = {A new definition of strategic stability is shown to satisfy all of
the requirements given by Elon Kohlberg and Jean-Francois Mertens
(1986). The definition follows the general form of the original
definition of Kohlberg and Mertens, but, rather than working with
perturbations of the payoffs or strategy space, works directly with
perturbations to the best reply correspondence. With the appropriate
topology on this space of perturbations, the resulting definition
does satisfy all of the requirements given by Kohlberg and Mertens.
It is shown that one does not have much freedom in the topology one
uses. },
annote = {A new definition of strategic stability is shown to satisfy all of
the requirements given by Elon Kohlberg and Jean-Francois Mertens
(1986). The definition follows the general form of the original
definition of Kohlberg and Mertens, but, rather than working with
perturbations of the payoffs or strategy space, works directly with
perturbations to the best reply correspondence. With the appropriate
topology on this space of perturbations, the resulting definition
does satisfy all of the requirements given by Kohlberg and Mertens.
It is shown that one does not have much freedom in the topology one
uses. }
}