@ARTICLE{19077825_2004, author = {Leitemo, Kai}, keywords = {inflation targeting, interaction of monetary and fiscal policy, взаимодействие фискальной и монетарной политики, теоретико-игровое моделирование}, title = {A Game between the Fiscal and the Monetary Authorities under Inflation Targeting }, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, year = {2004}, month = {}, volume = {20}, number = {3}, pages = {709-724}, url = {http://ecsocman.hse.ru/text/19077825/}, publisher = {}, language = {ru}, abstract = {Interest-rate and exchange-rate dynamics is studied in a game between the monetary and fiscal policymakers where the monetary policymaker targets inflation. In the Nash game, a conflict over the appropriate size of the output gap leads to excessive interest-rate and exchange-rate volatility. For this reason, there are benefits in restricting fiscal policymaking. If the fiscal policymaker, however, is considered to have a first-mover advantage, the fiscal policymaker will internalise its effect on monetary policy, and the conflict is resolved and interest-rate and exchange-rate volatility is reduced. }, annote = {Interest-rate and exchange-rate dynamics is studied in a game between the monetary and fiscal policymakers where the monetary policymaker targets inflation. In the Nash game, a conflict over the appropriate size of the output gap leads to excessive interest-rate and exchange-rate volatility. For this reason, there are benefits in restricting fiscal policymaking. If the fiscal policymaker, however, is considered to have a first-mover advantage, the fiscal policymaker will internalise its effect on monetary policy, and the conflict is resolved and interest-rate and exchange-rate volatility is reduced. } }