@ARTICLE{19077825_2004,
    author = {Leitemo, Kai}, 
    keywords = {inflation targeting, interaction of monetary and fiscal policy, взаимодействие фискальной и монетарной политики, теоретико-игровое моделирование},
    title = {A Game between the Fiscal and the Monetary Authorities under 
Inflation Targeting },
    journal = {European Journal of Political Economy},
    year = {2004},
    month = {},
    volume = {20},
    number = {3},
    pages = {709-724},
    url = {http://ecsocman.hse.ru/text/19077825/},
    publisher = {},
    language = {ru},
    abstract = {Interest-rate and exchange-rate dynamics is studied in a game between 
the monetary and fiscal policymakers where the monetary policymaker 
targets inflation. In the Nash game, a conflict over the appropriate 
size of the output gap leads to excessive interest-rate and 
exchange-rate volatility. For this reason, there are benefits in 
restricting fiscal policymaking. If the fiscal policymaker, however, 
is considered to have a first-mover advantage, the fiscal policymaker 
will internalise its effect on monetary policy, and the conflict is 
resolved and interest-rate and exchange-rate volatility is reduced. },
    annote = {Interest-rate and exchange-rate dynamics is studied in a game between 
the monetary and fiscal policymakers where the monetary policymaker 
targets inflation. In the Nash game, a conflict over the appropriate 
size of the output gap leads to excessive interest-rate and 
exchange-rate volatility. For this reason, there are benefits in 
restricting fiscal policymaking. If the fiscal policymaker, however, 
is considered to have a first-mover advantage, the fiscal policymaker 
will internalise its effect on monetary policy, and the conflict is 
resolved and interest-rate and exchange-rate volatility is reduced. }
}