TY  - JOUR
TI  - Interaction of Commitment and Discretion in Monetary and Fiscal 
Policies 
T2  - American Economic Review
IS  - 5
KW  - monetary and fiscal policy
KW  - взаимодействие фискальной и монетарной политики
KW  - дискреционная политика
KW  - политика правил
KW  - теоретико-игровое моделирование
AB  - We consider monetary-fiscal interaction when the monetary authority 
is more conservative than the fiscal. With both policies 
discretionary, (1) Nash equilibrium yields lower output and higher 
price than the ideal points of both authorities, (2) of the two 
leadership possibilities, fiscal leadership is generally better. With 
fiscal discretion, monetary commitment yields the same outcome as 
discretionary monetary leadership for all realizations of shocks. But 
fiscal commitment is not similarly negated by monetary discretion. 
Second-best outcomes require either joint commitment, or identical 
targets for the two authorities - output socially optimal and price 
level appropriately conservative - or complete separation of tasks. 
AU  - Dixit, Avinash K.
AU  - Lambertini, Luisa
UR  - http://ecsocman.hse.ru/text/19080759/
PY  - 2003
SP  - 1522-1542
M2  - 1522
VL  - 93
SN  - 
N1  - 
LA  - EN
CY  - 
PB  - 
M3  - 
LB  - 
VL  - 
ER  -