@ARTICLE{19128936_1991,
author = {Fudenberg, Drew and Tirole, Jean},
keywords = {dynamic game, perfect Bayesian equilibrium, динамические игры, математическое моделирование, равновесие в игре, экономическое поведение},
title = {Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium and Sequential Equilibrium},
journal = {Journal of Economic Theory},
year = {1991},
month = {},
volume = {53},
number = {2},
pages = {236-260},
url = {http://ecsocman.hse.ru/text/19128936/},
publisher = {},
language = {ru},
abstract = {We introduce a formal definition of perfect Bayesian equilibrium
(PBE) for multi-period games with observed actions. In a PBE, (P) the
strategies form a Bayesian equilibrium for each continuation game,
given the specified beliefs, and (B) beliefs are updated from period
to period in accordance with Bayes rule whenever possible, and
satisfy a “no-signaling-what-you-don't-know” condition.
PBE is equivalent to sequential equilibrium if each player has only
two types, or there are only two periods, but differs otherwise.
Equivalence is restored by requiring that (B) apply to the relative
probabilities of types with posterior probability zero. },
annote = {We introduce a formal definition of perfect Bayesian equilibrium
(PBE) for multi-period games with observed actions. In a PBE, (P) the
strategies form a Bayesian equilibrium for each continuation game,
given the specified beliefs, and (B) beliefs are updated from period
to period in accordance with Bayes rule whenever possible, and
satisfy a “no-signaling-what-you-don't-know” condition.
PBE is equivalent to sequential equilibrium if each player has only
two types, or there are only two periods, but differs otherwise.
Equivalence is restored by requiring that (B) apply to the relative
probabilities of types with posterior probability zero. }
}