@ARTICLE{19138176_1998,
    author = {Vitols, Sigurt}, 
    keywords = {banking system, comparative corporate governance, comparative financial systems, corporate governance, German banks, varieties of capitalism},
    title = {Are German banks different?},
    journal = {Small Business Economics},
    year = {1998},
    month = {},
    volume = {10},
    number = {2},
    pages = {79-91},
    url = {http://ecsocman.hse.ru/text/19138176/},
    publisher = {},
    language = {ru},
    abstract = {In recent years there has been a vigorous revival of the 
long-standing debate about the "uniqueness" of German banks. To date 
little consensus has been reached; while some see few differences 
between the role of banks in Germany and in other countries, others 
claim that universal banks' equity shareholdings in and nomination of 
representatives to the boards of nonfinancial firms are the key 
institutional features driving the rest of the "German model" of 
long-term investment in high-quality, internationally competitive 
manufacturing. This article argues that the uniqueness of the German 
banking system lies (1) in its unusually high capacity to provide 
industrial finance in the form of long-term debt capital, and (2) in 
its avoidance of the "speculative boom-credit crunch" cycle 
experienced by almost every other advanced industrialized country in 
the 1980s and early 1990s. These two key characteristics are 
attributable to a regulatory framework which involves strict 
prudential regulation, access to long-term refinancing sources, and a 
federalist form of corporatism. Furthermore, the behavior of German 
banks must be analyzed within a broader institutional system of 
economic governance which includes corporatist labor market 
institutions and a relatively large and modern SME sector. },
    annote = {In recent years there has been a vigorous revival of the 
long-standing debate about the "uniqueness" of German banks. To date 
little consensus has been reached; while some see few differences 
between the role of banks in Germany and in other countries, others 
claim that universal banks' equity shareholdings in and nomination of 
representatives to the boards of nonfinancial firms are the key 
institutional features driving the rest of the "German model" of 
long-term investment in high-quality, internationally competitive 
manufacturing. This article argues that the uniqueness of the German 
banking system lies (1) in its unusually high capacity to provide 
industrial finance in the form of long-term debt capital, and (2) in 
its avoidance of the "speculative boom-credit crunch" cycle 
experienced by almost every other advanced industrialized country in 
the 1980s and early 1990s. These two key characteristics are 
attributable to a regulatory framework which involves strict 
prudential regulation, access to long-term refinancing sources, and a 
federalist form of corporatism. Furthermore, the behavior of German 
banks must be analyzed within a broader institutional system of 
economic governance which includes corporatist labor market 
institutions and a relatively large and modern SME sector. }
}