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Институциональная экономика (подробнее...)

Статьи

Всего статей в данном разделе : 84

Опубликовано на портале: 07-10-2003
Eric A. Posner John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Papers. 2002.  No. 146.
С точки зрения Познера, направление право и экономика не смогло выдвинуть релевантную теорию, описывающую контрактные доктрины. В статье зафиксированы эти провалы и обсуждается предположение о том, что их причиной послужили методологические проблемы в определении трансакционных издержек.
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Опубликовано на портале: 14-03-2003
Bouckaert Boudewijn, De Geest Gerrit
Детальная библиогафия по праву и экономике.
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Family firms [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 06-11-2008
Mike Burkart, Fausto Panunzi, Andrei Shleifer Journal of Finance. 2003.  Vol. 58. No. 5. P. 2167-2201 . 
We present a model of succession in a firm owned and managed by its founder. The founder decides between hiring a professional manager or leaving management to his heir, as well as on what fraction of the company to float on the stock exchange. We assume that a professional is a better manager than the heir, and describe how the founder's decision is shaped by the legal environment. This theory of separation of ownership from management includes the Anglo-Saxon and the Continental European patterns of corporate governance as special cases, and generates additional empirical predictions consistent with cross-country evidence.
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Опубликовано на портале: 05-02-2003
Louis Kaplow Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. 1999. 
This chapter addresses two fundamental characteristics of rules. The first concerns the degree of precision, detail, or complexity they embody: how finely are different sorts of behavior to be distinguished? A second aspect of legal commands concerns when a given level of detail is provided - at the time of promulgation (rules) or subsequent to individuals actions, in the context of adjudication (standards). These aspects of rules are considered from a perspective that focuses upon information costs and dissemination: different sorts of legal commands involve differing costs of formulation and application by private parties (deciding upon their own conduct) and adjudicators, and the character of laws also influences how well parties actually will understand the law and conform their conduct accordingly. The discussion encompasses related questions involving the role of precedent, the evolution of the law over time, legal uncertainty and accuracy in adjudication. This chapter also addresses the separate problem of how changes in legal rules should apply to prior behavior or preexisting investments - issues of retroactivity and transition.
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Опубликовано на портале: 05-11-2008
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer Journal of Finance. 2002.  Vol. 57. No. 1. P. 265-301. 
We assemble data on government ownership of banks around the world. The data show that such ownership is large and pervasive, and higher in countries with low levels of per capita income, backward financial systems, interventionist and inefficient governments, and poor protection of property rights. Higher government ownership of banks in 1970 is associated with slower subsequent financial development and lower growth of per capita income and productivity. This evidence supports "political" theories of the effects of government ownership of firms.
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Опубликовано на портале: 05-02-2003
Steven G. Medema, Nicholas Mercuro, Warren J. Samuels Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. 1999. 
From its beginnings in the late nineteenth century, institutional economics has been concerned with the analysis of the interrelations between legal and economic processes. The institutional approach to law and economics examines both the influence of economy upon law and legal reasoning and the influence of law and legal change upon economic activity and performance. This essay examines the central tenants of institutional law and economics, dating from the early work of individuals such as Robert Lee Hale and John R. Commons and through its modern manifestations. As such, it emphasizes the evolutionary nature of law and economy, the tension between continuity and change, the problem of order, the reciprocal nature of legal-economic problems and the attendant dual nature of rights, the problematic nature of efficiency, and the need for a comparative institutional approach to the practice of law and economics. By recognizing the multiplicity of potential solutions to legal-economic problems and the underlying value premises attending each, the comparative institutional approach to law and economics attempts to flesh out both what is actually going on within the legal-economic nexus and the alternative possibilities open to society within the legal-economic decision-making process.
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Опубликовано на портале: 07-10-2003
Dennis William Carlton, Robert H. Gertner NBER Working Paper Series. 2002.  No. 8796.
В работе анализируется противоречие между антимонопольным законодательством, пытающимся обеспечить статическую эффективность рынков, и законом об интеллектуальных правах собственности, связанным с динамическими аспектами конкуренции в научно-исследовательском секторе. Исследование проводится применительно к политике слияния. Поднимается вопрос о необходимости координации применения двух законов.
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Опубликовано на портале: 29-10-2008
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny Journal of Financial Economics. 2000.  Vol. 58. No. 1-2. P. 3-27. 
Recent research has documented large differences among countries in ownership concentration in publicly traded firms, in the breadth and depth of capital markets, in dividend policies, and in the access of firms to external finance. A common element to the explanations of these differences is how well investors, both shareholders and creditors, are protected by law from expropriation by the managers and controlling shareholders of firms. We describe the differences in laws and the effectiveness of their enforcement across countries, discuss the possible origins of these differences, summarize their consequences, and assess potential strategies of corporate governance reform. We argue that the legal approach is a more fruitful way to understand corporate governance and its reform than the conventional distinction between bank-centered and market-centered financial systems.
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Опубликовано на портале: 29-10-2008
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny Journal of Finance. 2002.  Vol. 57. No. 3. P. 1147-1170. 
We present a model of the effects of legal protection of minority shareholders and of cash-flow ownership by a controlling shareholder on the valuation of firms. We then test this model using a sample of 539 large firms from 27 wealthy economies. Consistent with the model, we find evidence of higher valuation of firms in countries with better protection of minority shareholders and in firms with higher cash-flow ownership by the controlling shareholder.
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Опубликовано на портале: 06-11-2008
Andrei Shleifer, D. Wolfenzon Journal of Financial Economics. 2002.  Vol. 66. No. 1. P. 3-27 . 
We present a simple model of an entrepreneur going public in an environment with poor legal protection of outside shareholders. The model incorporates elements of Becker's (J. Political Econ. 106 (1968) 172) "crime and punishment" framework into a corporate finance environment of Jensen and Meckling (J. Financial Econ. 3 (1976) 305). We examine the entrepreneur's decision and the market equilibrium. The model is consistent with a number of empirical regularities concerning the relation between investor protection and corporate finance. It also sheds light on the patterns of capital flows between rich and poor countries and on the politics of reform of investor protection.
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Опубликовано на портале: 14-03-2003
Детальная библиография по праву и экономике (статьи). Открытый доступ к оглавнениям журналов по праву и экономике: European Journal of Law and Economics; International Review of Law and Economics; Journal of Law, Economics and Organization и др.
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Law and Finance [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 29-10-2008
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny Journal of Political Economy. 1998.  Vol. 106. No. 6. P. 1113-1155. 
This paper examines legal rules covering protection of corporate shareholders and creditors, the origin of these rules, and the quality of their enforcement in 49 countries. The results show that common-law countries generally have the strongest, and French-civil-law countries the weakest, legal protections of investors, with German- and Scandinavian-civil-law countries located in the middle. We also find that concentration of ownership of shares in the largest public companies is negatively related to investor protections, consistent with the hypothesis that small, diversified shareholders are unlikely to be important in countries that fail to protect their rights.
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Опубликовано на портале: 06-10-2003
Kathryn Hendley, Peter Murrell, Randi Ryterman
Анализ данных, проведенный авторами, показывает определенный успех развития правовых институтов в России. Экономическая и институциональная среда стимулируют предприятия инвестировать в разработку легальной контрактной системы, которая создает новые возможности для легальной занятости/работы.
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Опубликовано на портале: 06-11-2008
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny Journal of Finance. 1997.  Vol. 52. No. 3. P. 1131-1150. 
Using a sample of 49 countries, we show that countries with poorer investor protections, measured by both the character of legal rules and the quality of law enforcement, have smaller and narrower capital markets. These findings apply to both equity and debt markets. In particular, French civil law countries have both the weakest investor protections and the least developed capital markets, especially as compared to common law countries.
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Опубликовано на портале: 17-09-2004
Alison Balchin Employee Relations. 1994.  Vol. 16. No. 7.
Draws on a small research study undertaken in the retail industry, providing a very timely consideration of the choices and circumstances of those who work on a part-time basis. Considers the reasons given by workers for choosing part-time work, the costs involved and the extent to which part-time workers are aware of these when making their decision. The research considers the role of trade unions in enhancing awareness of legal entitlements in view of the recent House of Lords ruling.
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