American Political Science Review
Опубликовано на портале: 25-05-2009Torben Iversen, David Soskice, Thomas R. Cusack American Political Science Review. 2007. Vol. 110. No. 3. P. 373-391 .
The standard explanation for the choice of electoral institutions, building on Rokkan's seminal, is that proportional representation (PR) was adopted by a divided right to defend its class interests against a a rising left. But new evidence shows that PR strengthens the left and redistribution, and we argue the standard view is wrong historically, analytically, and empirically. We offer a radically different explanation. Integrating two opposed interpretations of PR-minimum winning coalitions versus consensus-we propose that the right adopted PR when their support for consensual regulatory frameworks, especially those of labor markets and skill formation where co-specific investments were important, outweighed their opposition to the redistributive consequences; this occurred in countries with previously densely organized local economies. In countries with adversarial industrial relations, and weak coordination of business and unions, keeping majoritarian institutions helped contain the left. This explains the close association between current varieties of capitalism and electoral institutions, and why they persist over time.
Electoral Institutions, Parties and the Politics of Class: Why some Democracies Distribute more than Others [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 25-03-2008David Soskice, Torben Iversen American Political Science Review. 2006. Vol. 100. No. 2. P. 165-181.
We develop a general model of redistribution and use it to account for the remarkable variance in government redistribution across democracies. We show that the electoral system plays a key role because it shapes the nature of political parties and the composition of governing coalitions, whether these are conceived as electoral alliances between classes or alliances between class parties. Our argument implies a) that center-left governments dominate under PR systems, while center-right governments dominate under majoritarian systems, and b) that PR systems redistribute more than majoritarian systems. We test our argument on panel data for redistribution, government partisanship, and electoral system in advanced democracies.
Опубликовано на портале: 23-12-2002Jonathan Kelley, Ian McAllister, Anthony Mughan American Political Science Review. 1985. Vol. 79. No. 3.
Class has long been the preeminent source of political conflict in industrial society, but its electoral influence has declined in recent years. The sources of the decline are not yet firmly established, and moreover the implications for political parties remain unclear. The decline-of-class hypothesis states that parties on the left will decline as the working class becomes more affluent and adopts middle-class styles of conduct. By contrast, the party-appeals hypothesis suggests that as the electorate becomes more middle class, parties of the left will alter their appeals to encompass the growing middle class and so offset the shrinkage of their traditional working-class constituency. This article applies multivariate anaysis to survey data collected in England between 1964 and 1979 to test four specific hypotheses derived from the two scenarios. The results support the decline-of-class theory's prediction that economic development erodes the working-class bases of left-wing parties, but not its claim that the left-wing party's vote declines proportionately. Rather, the results suggest that parties are apparently able to change their appeals to reduce their losses, as argued by the party-appeals theory, but not to eliminate them. It seems that their are restraints on parties' ability to change their appeals, limitations not envisioned by the party appeals theory.