American Economic Review
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Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002Marco Cagetti American Economic Review. 2001. Vol. 91. No. 2. P. 418-421.
This paper examines the question of whether households adjust savings in response to interest rates in a life-cycle model with precautionary savings, where both motives for saving (retirement and precautionary) are present. While uncertainty may be the most important motive for younger households, eventually, households will start saving for retirement as well. By how much the wealth of the median household at retirement changes after an exogenous permanent increase in the after-tax interest rate is computed. In an estimated life-cycle model with precautionary savings, the elasticity of savings is also very low. However, the results are sensitive to the utility parameters.
Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002Laura Chadwick, Gary Solon American Economic Review. 2002. Vol. 92. No. 1. P. 335-344.
New evidence on daughters' intergenerational mobility in a framework that encompasses women not in the labor force, using broader measures of economic status than just the women's own earnings, is presented, and the role of husbands' earnings is highlighted. A parallel analysis of sons' mobility is performed. Intergenerational transmission of income status may be weaker for daughters than for sons, but is still quite substantial. Assortative mating is an important element in the intergenerational transmission process.
Markets and Diversity [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002Sherwin Rosen American Economic Review. 2002. Vol. 92. No. 1. P. 1-15.
Despite the importance of diversity in economic life, only a small part of economic theory is devoted to analyzing differences. Competitive markets value diversity and sort out complex patterns of tastes and technologies that translate into supply of and demand for an enormous variety of products and factors of production. The theory of diversity applies universally and is manifest in many economic problems. This paper explores 3 themes: Markets value diversity, markets sort buyers and sellers appropriately to take advantage of heterogeneous talents and tastes, and sorting and choice create income inequality.
Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002Shlomo Benartzi, Richard H. Thaler American Economic Review. 2001. Vol. 91. No. 1. P. 79-98.
There is a worldwide trend toward defined contribution saving plans and growing interest in privatized social security plans. In both environments, individuals are given some responsibility to make their own asset-allocation decisions, raising concerns about how well they do at this task. This paper investigates one aspect of the task, namely diversification. It is shown that some investors follow the "1/n strategy": they divide their contributions evenly across the funds offered in the plan. Consistent with this naive notion of diversification, it is found that the proportion invested in stocks depends strongly on the proportion of stock funds in the plan.
Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002Dani Rodrik American Economic Review. 2000. Vol. 90. No. 2. P. 140-144.
Few would doubt the proposition that political institutions matter for economic development. Yet robust generalizations and systematic evidence on how exactly they do so are lacking. In this paper, attention is drawn to regularity in the cross-national data that has received little attention to date: participatory political regimes are associated with significantly lower levels of aggregate economic instability. After presenting some of the evidence, it is speculated that the reason has to do with the propensity of democracy to moderate social conflict and induce compromise. Three distinct arguments as to why this may be the case are presented.
Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002John McLaren American Economic Review. 2000. Vol. 90. No. 5. P. 1239-1254.
This paper analyzes the effects of international openness on vertical integration. Vertical integration can confer a negative externality, by thinning the market for inputs and thus worsening opportunism problems; this induces strategic complementarity and multiple equilibria in the integration decision, thus providing a theory of different industrial systems or industrial cultures in ex ante identical countries. International openness thickens the market, facilitating leaner, less integrated firms, thus providing gains from international openness quite different from those that are familiar from trade theory. This may be taken as one theory of outsourcing, downsizing, and Japanization as consequences of globalization.
Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002William Darity American Economic Review. 2000. Vol. 90. No. 2. P. 308-311.
International racial and ethnic economic inequality is examined. The international record shows disparity across nations and regions, between racial and ethnic groups within countries, and within groups in the same country. Subalternate racial and ethnic populations, whether in the majority or minority, suffer remarkably similar economic outcomes across the globe. Institutional racism and cultural discrimination affect subcultures and different classes in multiple ways. In every country, those who get the short stick continue to face poor prospects for economic inclusion and justice.
Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002Brian L. Goff, Robert E. McCormick, Robert D. Tollison American Economic Review. 2002. Vol. 92. No. 1. P. 16-26.
This paper treats racial integration as an innovation in economic process in which economic entities find it advantageous to utilize potentially more productive inputs previously unavailable due to law, custom, or managerial discretion. Data on the racial integration of Major League Baseball and Atlantic Coast Conference basketball are employed to address this issue. The central question examined is which type of team integrated first - losers or winners. The results strongly support the idea that entrepreneurship trumps competitive rivalry; that is, winning teams led the process of racial integration.
Rents, competition, and corruption [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002Alberto Ades, Rafael Di Tella American Economic Review. 1999. Vol. 89. No. 4. P. 982-993.
Theoretically the effect of competition on corruption is ambiguous. Less competition means firms enjoy higher rents, so that bureaucrats with control rights over them, such as tax inspectors or regulators, have higher incentives to engage in malfeasant behavior. Examples of a positive connection between rents and corruption abound, however. The hypothesis that natural rents, as in the case of oil, and rents induced by lack of product market competition foster corruption, is examined. A model is set up connecting rents to corruption.
Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002Hanming Fang American Economic Review. 2001. Vol. 91. No. 4. P. 924-937.
The connection between obtaining higher paying jobs and undertaking some seemingly irrelevant activity is interpreted as social culture. In the context of a society trying to adopt a new technology, it is shown that by allowing the firms to give preferential treatment to workers based on some cultural activity, the society can partially overcome an informational free-riding problem. Therefore, social culture may affect the economic performance by altering the effective production technology of the economy.
Опубликовано на портале: 13-02-2004Jon Gruber, David A. Wise American Economic Review. 1998. Vol. 88. No. 2. P. 158-163.
This article concerns the following items: 1) Decline in labour-force participation; 2) Social Security benefit accrual and the implicit tax on work; 3) The importance of the early-retirement age; 4) The implicit tax on work and labour-force participation; etc.
Опубликовано на портале: 29-04-2004Daron K. Acemoglu, Thierry Verdier American Economic Review. 2000. Vol. 90. No. 1. P. 194-211.
Because government intervention transfers resources from one party to another, it creates room for corruption. As corruption often undermines the purpose of the intervention, governments will try to prevent it. They may create rents for bureaucrats, induce a misallocation of resources, and increase the size of the bureaucracy. Since preventing all corruption is excessively costly, second-best intervention may involve a certain fraction of bureaucrats accepting bribes. When corruption is harder to prevent, there may be both more bureaucrats and higher public-sector wages. Also, the optimal degree of government intervention may be nonmonotonic in the level of income.
Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas, Jonathan A. Parker American Economic Review. 2001. Vol. 91. No. 2. P. 406-412.
One of the basic motives for saving is the accumulation of wealth to ensure future welfare. Both introspection and extant research on consumption insurance find that people face substantial risks that they do not fairly pool. A simple decomposition that characterizes the importance of precautionary saving in the US economy is presented. This decomposition is used as an organizing framework to present four main findings: 1. the concavity of the consumption policy rule, 2. the importance of precautionary saving for life-cycle saving and wealth accumulation, 3. the contribution of changes in risk to fluctuations in aggregate consumption, and 4. the significant impact of incomplete markets on aggregate fluctuations in calibrated general-equilibrium models. The study is concluded with directions for future research.
The possibility of social choice [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002Amartya Sen American Economic Review. 1999. Vol. 89. No. 3. P. 349-378.
The subject of social choice includes within its capacious frame various problems with the common feature of relating social judgments and group decisions to the views and interests of the individuals who make up the society or the group. Some challenges and foundational problems faced by social choice theory as a discipline are discussed. Social choice theory is a subject in which formal and mathematical techniques have been very extensively used. Voting-based procedures are entirely natural for some kinds of social choice problems, such as elections, referendums, or committee decisions. They are, however, altogether unsuitable for many other problems of social choice. Impossibility results in social choice theory - led by the pioneering work of Arrow (1951) - have often been interpreted as being thoroughly destructive of the possibility of reasoned and democratic social choice, including welfare economics. That view is argued against.
Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002Jonathan A. Parker American Economic Review. 1999. Vol. 89. No. 4. P. 959-973.
The key implication of rational expectations and the basic life-cycle/permanent-income hypothesis: that predictable changes in income have no effect on the growth rate of consumption expenditures, is examined. This implication is important for understanding the effectiveness and optimal timing of fiscal policy, the causes and propagation of business cycles, and the effects of income fluctuations on the growth rate of the economy. Using household-level consumption data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey, whether expenditures on nondurable goods increase contemporaneously with predictable changes in Social Security tax withholding is tested. It is found that households do change their consumption expenditures in response to the predictable fluctuations in income induced by the Social Security tax system.