American Economic Review
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Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002Anthony P. Carnevale, Richard A. Fry, Lindsay B. Lowell American Economic Review. 2001. Vol. 91. No. 2. P. 159-163.
An immigrant's ability to understand the spoken word is a preeminent English ability for labor-market success on average. Reading, writing, and speaking ability are not significantly predictors of immigrant wages after considering ability to understand the spoken word. The magnitude of the wage impact of understanding only is similar to that found in the literature on speaking only, suggesting their kinship in an underlying construct of English proficiency, and reinforcing the finding that language matters. These findings indicate that hearing and comprehending are perhaps most fundamental in the immigrant labor market. The findings also suggest that, after having achieved a given level of understanding of the spoken word, then improved skills in speaking, reading, and writing do matter to employers. Understanding is the key starting place to getting into the labor market and that subsequent incremental increases in productivity may require a greater array of English skills.
Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002Padma Desai American Economic Review. 2000. Vol. 90. No. 2. P. 48-52.
The factors that led to the collapse of the ruble are analyzed. It is argued that it resulted from exogenous factors (closely related to the unanticipated Asian financial crisis) interacting with inherited weaknesses in fundamentals (of fiscal policy) that made the Russian economy, while progressively being brought to macroeconomic stability, nonetheless vulnerable to a large external shock. It is contended that, instead of the policy mistake of August 1998 requiring a default of domestic debt and moratorium on payment of foreign commercial debt, a decision by Russian authorities to offer temporary exchange controls, sanctioned by the IMF and the U.S. Treasury as an emergency measure, would have been a better alternative, obviating the de facto partial and unilateral resort to controls that the moratorium and default implied.