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American Economic Review

Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002
Gordon B. Dahl, Michael R. Ransom American Economic Review. 1999.  Vol. 89. No. 4. P. 703-727. 
Economists and psychologists argue that individuals skew personal beliefs to accord with their own interests. To test for this presence of self-serving beliefs, 1,200 members of the Mormon Church were surveyed about tithing. A tithe is a voluntary contribution equal to 10% of income. Since respondents must decide privately what income items to tithe, how the income definition depends on an individual's religious and financial incentives was observed. Surprisingly little evidence was found that an individual's financial situation influences beliefs about what counts as income for the tithe. However, ambiguity increases the role for self-serving biases.
Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002
John Duffy American Economic Review. 1999.  Vol. 89. No. 4. P. 847-877. 
Findings are reported from an experiment that implements a search-theoretic model of money as a medium of exchange. The question is whether subjects learn to adopt the same commodities as media of exchange that the model predicts will be used in equilibrium. It is reported that subjects have a strong tendency to play fundamental rather than speculative strategies even in environments where speculative strategies yield higher payoffs. Some possible motivations for subjects' behavior are examined, and it is concluded that subjects are mainly motivated by past payoff experience as opposed to the marketability considerations that the theory emphasizes.
Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002
Rachel Croson, Nancy Buchan American Economic Review. 1999.  Vol. 89. No. 2. P. 386-39. 
Gender is rarely included as a factor in economic models. However, recent work in experimental economics, as well as in psychology and political science, suggests that gender is an important determinant of economic and strategic behavior. Gender differences in bargaining are examined using the trust game introduced by Joyce Berg et al. (1995). In this two-person game, the proposer is given a choice of sending some, all, or none of his or her $10 experimental payment to an anonymous partner, the responder. For US subjects, Berg et al. found that 30 of 32 proposers deviated from economic equilibrium and sent some money to their partners. In sending money, proposers are trusting that their partners will return some money to them. In addition, 24 out of 32 of responders who received money returned some. Gender differences in this game are discussed.
Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002
Donna K. Ginther, Kathy J. Hayes American Economic Review. 1999.  Vol. 89. No. 2. P. 397-402. 
In their annual review of academic salaries, the American Association of University Professors observes large gender-related salary differentials. At doctoral-level institutions, male professors at the rank of full professor earn 11.4% more than women full professors. Data on academic labor markets from the Survey of Doctorate Recipients to evaluate gender differences in salaries and promotion probabilities. Differences in employment outcomes by gender are found using two methods: the Oaxaca decomposition is used to examine salary differentials, and duration analysis is used to estimate promotion to tenure. While gender salary differences can largely be explained by academic rank, substantial gender differences in promotion to tenure exist after controlling for productivity, demographic characteristics, and primary work activity.
Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002
Harriet Orcott Duleep, Mark C. Regets American Economic Review. 1999.  Vol. 89. No. 2. P. 186-191. 
The following question is approached theoretically and empirically: Why do immigrants invest more in human capital than the native-born, and how do investment patterns vary by type of immigrant? It is found that greater immigrant human capital investment is due to the lower opportunity costs of investment by immigrants lacking US-specific skills and the role of untransferred human capital as a factor of production for destination-country skills, as well as the higher return to investment spending from the complementarity of foreign and US human capital. This theoretical insight is supported by direct evidence of human capital investment and by empirical analyses.
Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002
Haizhou Huang, Chenggang Xu American Economic Review. 1999.  Vol. 89. No. 2. P. 438-443. 
The fundamental importance of economic institutions for economic growth through their impact on technological change has long been argued by Joseph Schumpter and others. Recent empirical studies have reconfirmed such arguments. Robert Barro (1997) finds that economic and political institutions are the most important factors in explaining differences in growth across economies. New growth theory has made major breakthroughs in endogenizing technological changes. However, although some insightful and inspiring discussions of institutional impacts of innovation are provided, there is little attempt in these models to explain what, aside from capital, labor inputs, and knowledge accumulation, determines innovation. An attempt is made to fill the gap in literature by examining how financial institutions affect technological innovation and thus affect growth.
Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002
Alberto Ades, Rafael Di Tella American Economic Review. 1999.  Vol. 89. No. 4. P. 982-993. 
Theoretically the effect of competition on corruption is ambiguous. Less competition means firms enjoy higher rents, so that bureaucrats with control rights over them, such as tax inspectors or regulators, have higher incentives to engage in malfeasant behavior. Examples of a positive connection between rents and corruption abound, however. The hypothesis that natural rents, as in the case of oil, and rents induced by lack of product market competition foster corruption, is examined. A model is set up connecting rents to corruption.
Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002
Amartya Sen American Economic Review. 1999.  Vol. 89. No. 3. P. 349-378. 
The subject of social choice includes within its capacious frame various problems with the common feature of relating social judgments and group decisions to the views and interests of the individuals who make up the society or the group. Some challenges and foundational problems faced by social choice theory as a discipline are discussed. Social choice theory is a subject in which formal and mathematical techniques have been very extensively used. Voting-based procedures are entirely natural for some kinds of social choice problems, such as elections, referendums, or committee decisions. They are, however, altogether unsuitable for many other problems of social choice. Impossibility results in social choice theory - led by the pioneering work of Arrow (1951) - have often been interpreted as being thoroughly destructive of the possibility of reasoned and democratic social choice, including welfare economics. That view is argued against.
Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002
Jonathan A. Parker American Economic Review. 1999.  Vol. 89. No. 4. P. 959-973. 
The key implication of rational expectations and the basic life-cycle/permanent-income hypothesis: that predictable changes in income have no effect on the growth rate of consumption expenditures, is examined. This implication is important for understanding the effectiveness and optimal timing of fiscal policy, the causes and propagation of business cycles, and the effects of income fluctuations on the growth rate of the economy. Using household-level consumption data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey, whether expenditures on nondurable goods increase contemporaneously with predictable changes in Social Security tax withholding is tested. It is found that households do change their consumption expenditures in response to the predictable fluctuations in income induced by the Social Security tax system.