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В разделе собрана информация о статьях по экономике, социологии и менеджменту. Во многих случаях приводятся полные тексты статей. (подробнее...)

American Journal of Sociology

Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002
Vivek Chibber American Journal of Sociology. 2002.  Vol. 107. No. 4. P. 951-989. 
There has been a resuscitation of the view that the state can play an important role in the industrialization process. But, for states to be successful in fostering development, they need a considerable degree of internal cohesiveness, which is generally supplied by the presence of a robust, Weberian bureaucratic corps. This article argues that, while internal cohesiveness is indeed critical, bureaucratic rule following can produce results in the opposite direction, depending on the interagency relations that obtain within the state. The effect of interagency relations is demonstrated through an examination of India and Korea. Both have worked to foster industrialization, and both are endowed with relatively healthy bureaucracies. However, the Indian state was paralyzed and fragmented, while its Korean counterpart did secure the requisite internal coherence. Not only did the culture of rule following fail to generate a cohesive state in India, but it, in fact, worked against such an outcome.
Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002
Jeffrey Haydu American Journal of Sociology. 2002.  Vol. 107. No. 6. P. 1424-1467. 
This article links class analysis and institutionalism through a case study of late-19th-century employers. Class analysis extends institutionalism by highlighting an additional source of cultural transposition a generalized identity summarized here as "business citizenship." Institutionalism, in turn, shows how civic associations worked to unify employers and foster an overarching class consciousness. The case study provides an overview of class formation among Cincinnati employers and illustrates how business citizenship carried over from the realms of political reform and high culture to personnel management and industrial training. Some comparative observations suggest this pattern of class formation and cultural transposition was typical.
Опубликовано на портале: 22-05-2004
Neil Fligstein, Alec S. Sweet American Journal of Sociology. 2002.  Vol. 107. No. 5. P. 1206-1243. 
As institutions and governance structures develop in modern markets, they tend to "feed back" onto economic activity. Through such feedback loops, market and political arenas can develop symbiotically into relatively coherent "fields" that gradually embed actors' orientations and activities. Using these insights, this article develops and tests a theory of European integration focusing on the case of the European Community, the first pillar of the European Union. Traders, organized interests, courts, and the EC's policy-making organs, over time, have produced a self-sustaining causal system that has driven the construction of the European market and polity. The generality of this explanation to a sociology of markets and polity-building projects is discussed in the conclusion.
Опубликовано на портале: 18-10-2004
Urs Bruegger, Karin Knorr Cetina American Journal of Sociology. 2002.  Vol. 107. No. 4. P. 905-950. 
Using participant-observation data, interviews, and trading transcripts drawn from interbank currency trading in global investment banks, this article examines regular patterns of integration that characterize the global social system embedded in economic transactions. To interpret these patterns, which are global in scope but microsocial in character, this article uses the term "global microstructures". Features of the interaction order, loosely defined, have become constitutive of and implanted in processes that have global breadth. This study draws on Schutz in the development of the concept of temporal coordination as the basis for the level of intersubjectivity discerned in global markets. This article contributes to economic sociology through the analysis of cambist (i.e., trading) markets, which are distinguished from producer markets, and by positing a form of market coordination that supplements relational or network forms of coordination.
Опубликовано на портале: 23-12-2002
Bertell Ollman American Journal of Sociology. 2002.  Vol. 73. No. 5. P. 573-580. 
We attempt to derive Marx's theory of class through the way he uses the terms, rather than through an interpretation of his most general statements on the subject, which is how class has usually been approached. "Class" is seen to refer to social and economic groupings based on a wide variety of standards whose interrelations are those Marx finds in the real society under examination. By conceptualizing a unity of apparently distinct social relations, "class" in Marxism is inextricably bound up with the truth of Marx's own analysis. Its utility is a function of the adequacy of this analysis.
Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002
Roger V. Gould American Journal of Sociology. 2002.  Vol. 107. No. 5. P. 1143-1178. 
This article offers a formal theoretical model of the emergence of hierarchy that bridges the division between individualistic and structuralist accounts of inequality. In the model, actors reproduce status hierarchies by adjusting their own status-conferring gestures according to collective attributions. These collective attributions are just the aggregate of individual gestures, leading to a self-reinforcing status ranking. Winner-take-all hierarchies are discouraged, however, when people prefer reciprocation of their status-conferring actions. The model therefore depicts a status ranking as an equilibrium resulting from individual responses to the trade-off between social influence and the distaste for making unreciprocated gestures. Analysis of the model generates several precise predictions about the patterns that social networks should exhibit at equilibrium. Data on interaction in task groups, friendship ratings in a fraternity, and play in a set of infant quintuplets is used to show that the formal theory makes unusually accurate predictions about network structure.