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Что такое экономическая социология? Это не "междисциплинарные исследования". Это не "изучение социальных проблем в экономике". Это не проведение опросов населения. Это не маркетинговые исследования. Что же это? (подробнее...)

Статьи

Всего статей в данном разделе : 221

Опубликовано на портале: 05-11-2008
Edward Ludwig Glaeser, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer Journal of Economic Growth. 2004.  Vol. 9. No. 3. P. 271-303. 
We revisit the debate over whether political institutions cause economic growth, or whether, alternatively, growth and human capital accumulation lead to institutional improvement. We find that most indicators of institutional quality used to establish the proposition that institutions cause growth are constructed to be conceptually unsuitable for that purpose. We also find that some of the instrumental variable techniques used in the literature are flawed. Basic OLS results, as well as a variety of additional evidence, suggest that (a) human capital is a more basic source of growth than are the institutions, (b) poor countries get out of poverty through good policies, often pursued by dictators, and (c) subsequently improve their political institutions.
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Опубликовано на портале: 24-03-2008
Richard Whitley Organization Studies. 1994.  Vol. 15. P. 153-182. 
The identification of distinctive and effective forms of economic organization in East Asia has emphasized the close connections between dominant social institutions and ways of co-ordinating economic activities as well as the interrelations between firm and market characteristics in separate business systems. Differences in major institutions thus generate significant variations in how firms and markets are structured and operate. These variations suggest that an important element in the analysis of market economies is the comparison of firm-market relations across institutional contexts. This requires their key characteristics to be identified. These can be summarized under three main headings which constitute the components of business systems: the nature of firms as economic actors, the nature of inter-firm relations in markets and the nature of authoritative co-ordination and control systems within firms. Thirteen major characteristics form the basic dimensions of business systems, which vary as the result of differences in state structures, financial systems, cultural conventions and other key institutional features. Interdependences between these characteristics restrict the variety of business systems that become established in market economies and suggest that five major kinds can be identified on the basis of institutionalized patterns of risk-sharing and firm self-sufficiency: centrifugal, partitioned, collaborative, co-ordinated and state-dependent. These types of business system highlight the different patterns of economic organization, and some of their institutional connections, which have developed in Europe and other industrialized societies.
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Опубликовано на портале: 24-03-2008
Richard Whitley Organization Studies. 1990.  Vol. 11. No. 1. P. 47-74. 
The economic success of different forms of business organization in East Asian countries emphasizes the variety of viable enterprise structures and suggests the need for a comparative analysis of how they develop and operate in different societal contexts. Major differences between East Asian business 'recipes' include the range of activities that are authoritatively coordinated, their pattems of development, the ways in which they are organized and controlled and the organization of inter enterprise relations. These differences suggest eight major dimensions on which dominant enterprise structures in different societies can be compared and how their development can be linked to major social institutions.
Опубликовано на портале: 25-05-2009
Torben Iversen, David Soskice, Thomas R. Cusack American Political Science Review. 2007.  Vol. 110. No. 3. P. 373-391 . 
The standard explanation for the choice of electoral institutions, building on Rokkan's seminal, is that proportional representation (PR) was adopted by a divided right to defend its class interests against a a rising left. But new evidence shows that PR strengthens the left and redistribution, and we argue the standard view is wrong historically, analytically, and empirically. We offer a radically different explanation. Integrating two opposed interpretations of PR-minimum winning coalitions versus consensus-we propose that the right adopted PR when their support for consensual regulatory frameworks, especially those of labor markets and skill formation where co-specific investments were important, outweighed their opposition to the redistributive consequences; this occurred in countries with previously densely organized local economies. In countries with adversarial industrial relations, and weak coordination of business and unions, keeping majoritarian institutions helped contain the left. This explains the close association between current varieties of capitalism and electoral institutions, and why they persist over time.
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Опубликовано на портале: 15-11-2007
Wolfgang Streeck, Christine Trampusch German Politics. 2005.  Vol. 14. No. 2. P. 174-195. 
The central problem of the German economy is the high costs of labour, driven up by the burden of funding an extensive welfare state through social insurance contributions that operate as payroll taxes on employment. The study identifies the political causes of the long-term rise in non-wage labour costs. It analyses the reforms of the last decade, showing how the multiplicity of veto points in the German political economy has weakened reform initiatives and reduced the prospect for effective reform in the foreseeable future.
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Опубликовано на портале: 24-11-2008
Gregory Jackson Industrielle Beziehungen. 2005.  Vol. 23. No. 3. P. 1-28. 
Why do employees have rights to representation within corporate boards in some countries, but not in others? Board-level codetermination is widely considered a distinctive feature of coordinated or nonliberal models of capitalism. Existing literature stresses three sets of explanations for codetermination rooted in corporate governance, union strength and political systems. The paper compares data from 22 OECD countries using the QCA method (Qualitative Comparative Analysis) and fuzzy sets approach to explore necessary and sufficient conditions for board-level codetermination. The results show two central pathways toward codetermination both rooted primarily in union coordination and consensual political systems, but with divergent implications for corporate governance systems in Scandinavia and Germany.
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Опубликовано на портале: 25-03-2008
Robert Boyer PSE Working Papers. 2006.  No. 2006-21.
This paper challenges the conventional wisdom that the dynamism of employment is always contradictory to the enforcement of some forms of security for workers. Contemporary theorizing now recognizes the specificity of the wage-labour nexus. Consequently, minimum security is required for good economic performance by firms and national economies. A comparative analysis of OECD countries shows that the extended security promoted by welfare systems has not been detrimental to innovation, growth and job creation. Developing countries cannot immediately catch up with the emerging standards of flexicurity but the methodology of employment diagnosis might help them in designing security/flexibility configurations tailored according to their domestic economic specialization, social values and political choices.
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Опубликовано на портале: 07-02-2008
Martin Höpner Socio-Economic Review. 2005.  Vol. 3. No. 2. P. 383-388. 

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Опубликовано на портале: 20-11-2008
Martin Höpner, Helen Callaghan Comparative European Politics. 2005.  Vol. 3. No. 3. P. 307-332. 
Twenty years after the European Commission’s White Paper on the completion of the internal market, the integration of national markets for corporate control continues to lag behind the removal of barriers to trade in goods and services. To what extent does the protracted political battle over legal harmonization in this area reflect a clash of interests between liberal and coordinated national varieties of capitalism? To find out, we map the distribution of political support for liberal takeover rules within and across countries by analyzing a roll call vote on the takeover directive in the European Parliament in July 2001. Our data shows that, in line with the clash-of-capitalisms hypothesis, nationality did trump party group position on a left-right axis as a predictor of delegates’ attitudes toward takeover regulation. Given the increasing interference of EU-level legislative initiatives with the regulatory pillars of coordinated market economies, and the accession of ten new Eastern European member states, we expect the salience of the clash-of-capitalisms cleavage to increase in the near future.
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Опубликовано на портале: 18-12-2009
Nicole Woolsey Biggart Theory and Society. 2001.  Vol. 20. No. 2. P. 199-232. 
Conclusion: Social theorists are challenged to explain an increasingly complex economic order. It is clear that old theories that posited a developmental sequence from undeveloped to industrialized cannot explain the diverse patterns of industrialization that exist. Certainly, Japan is as developed as Western nations but its patterns of development, its economic norms, and its industrial practices are substantially different from the United States and even its Asian neighbors in Taiwan and South Korea. For example, the fact that Japan has the largest banks in the world, and Taiwan relatively few and weak ones (despite the world's largest per capita foreign reserve holdings), cannot be explained only by recourse to market or state factors, although each play a role. Both countries were literally awash in money in the 1980s, and both countries are clearly capitalist societies where banking institutions are assumed to be critical to economic development, as they have been in the West. But more than market and political economy factors are at work here. In Japan, historically developed institutional factors, dating from before the Meiji Restoration and industrial revolution, created conditions for business group self-financing. Modern-day keiretsu, such as Sumitomo and Mitsui, with their huge banks as centerpieces, trace their origins to pre-industrial merchant houses under family ownership. Inheritance practices in Japan are based on primogeniture, inheritance of the entire fortune by the eldest son. This practice allowed merchant family fortunes to remain intact under the stewardship of the heir. Successful families thus had huge sums of money available to finance the businesses of affiliated branches operating under the badge of the mother house. The descendents of the zaibatsu merchant houses, the keiretsu, continue to rely on their own sources of finance, now institutionalized in banks that serve their credit and other financial needs. To see large banks encapsulated within business networks as only the outcome of distorted market conditions, or as only the result of a powerful business class, misses the institutional origins and overlooks the contemporary institutional underpinnings of the Japanese banking system. Ironically, the weakness of Taiwanese banks can also be traced to a strong family system. Chinese societies practice partible inheritance, that is, division of a family estate equally among all sons. As a result, families divide their fortunes every generation, mitigating against the development of large sums of money. Instead, there is great pressure within families to develop multiple businesses so that at the death of the family head, each son can claim an independent enterprise. Because all Chinese families face the problem of setting up children in business (being an employee is not a desirable status in Taiwan as it is in Japan), a range of informal lending arrangements have arisen within families and among friends to generate investment capital. Strong social norms dictate that one assist financially a kin member or close friend. Banks play a relatively minor role in Taiwan because alternative institutional arrangements, also with preindustrial origins, have obviated the need for banks for some financial functions. Again, market factors are important to understanding the strong curb market and weak formal banking system in Taiwan, and political economy factors, notably the absence of a strong central bank, are also significant. But an institutional explanation integrates these factors into an explanation that begins with the character of the society being explained. We need theories that can account for difference without reducing cases to unique instances, that do not presume the individualistic character of Western social orders, and that are sensitive to an array of ideal as well as material factors operating in different locations. Although political economy, market, and culture theories each have contributions to make, an institutional perspective of the type I outline may be especially suited to the comparative analysis of emerging world economic organization. I think, ironically, that a sensitivity to institutional factors may yield better theories of the West. Rather than assume that the United States and Europe are the exemplars of advanced capitalism, the closest empirical instances of the idealized competitive market, Japan and other Asian nations are suggesting that the West is simply one form of capitalist economic development, an expression no doubt, of the West's own institutional heritage. When we relinquish ethnocentric perspectives we can begin to look at ourselves and our own institutional heritage more clearly.
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Опубликовано на портале: 17-11-2008
Sigurt Vitols WZB Discussion Paper. 1995.  No. 95 – 311.
A widely held view is that, since the 1970s, the nation-state has suffered a significant reduction in its capacity to achieve national economic policy goals through the regulation of the financial system; as a result, national political economies are now characterized by a market-driven convergence towards financial systems dominated by privately-owned, internationally-active “financial supermarkets” with weak links to both industry and government. Through a comparison of Germany and Great Britain, this paper critically examines this thesis and poses the following two questions: (1) What implications do the lifting of capital and exchange controls and the reorientation of monetary policy to anti-inflationary policies have for the state’s capacity to regulate financial systems? and (2) What implications does this regulatory discretion (if any) have for industrial finance and the state's capacity to utilize the financial system to achieve microeconomic industrial policy goals? In response to these questions, it is demonstrated how the state has retained significant regulatory autonomy in ways which have significant consequences for industrial finance and industrial policy.
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Опубликовано на портале: 24-03-2008
Richard Whitley Accounting, Organizations and Society. 1999.  Vol. 24. No. 5-6. P. 507-524 . 
It is becoming increasingly recognized that management accounting and management control procedures and systems vary significantly between organizations, sectors and societies. Four characteristics of control systems, in particular, differ considerably between institutional contexts. These are: the extent to which control is exercised overwhelmingly through formal rules and procedures, the degree of control exercised over how unit activities are carried out, the influence and involvement of unit members in exercising control, and the scope of the information used by the control system in evaluating performance and deciding rewards and sanctions. These four characteristics can be combined to constitute four distinct types of control system: bureaucratic, output, delegated and patriarchal. The relative use of these kinds of control systems-and their effectiveness-reflect major variations in the kinds of organizations and firms that coordinate economic activities through administrative procedures, and their related institutional contexts. The key features of firms here are the diversity of activities coordinated, their rate of change, shareholder lock-in and the degree of owner management. These in turn reflect the nature of the financial system and state structures and policies. Additionally, the ways that skill development is organised in a society and skills are controlled in labour markets affect control techniques and practices, as do the nature of authority and trust relations. Thus, Taylorian control systems are unlikely to be widely used in countries where skill training is highly organised and controlled jointly by employers and unions-as for example in many Central and Northern European states, just as delegated ones are improbable in societies where systemic trust is low and authority patterns are patriarchal.
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Опубликовано на портале: 12-11-2008
Sigurt Vitols Economy and Society. 2001.  Vol. 30. No. 4. P. 553-564. 
Germany's bank-based financial system has been generally perceived as good at providing long-term debt finance to traditional industry but poor at supplying equity capital to high-tech start-ups. In 1997 a special segment of the Frankfurt stock exchange, the Neuer Markt, was founded to improve the supply of high-risk equity capital in Germany. The subsequent listing of over 300 companies on the Neuer Markt, many of them in technology-intensive sectors, has led to speculation that Germany is rapidly closing the gap with the US, the world leader in high technology. Contrary to this view, this article suggests that these companies have more in common with traditional German small and medium-sized companies (SMEs) than with the Silicon Valley model of governance and innovation.
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Опубликовано на портале: 25-03-2008
Robert Boyer Competition and Change. 2005.  Vol. 9. No. 1. P. 7–47. 
Why did CEO remuneration explode during the 1990s and persist at high levels, even after the Internet bubble burst? This article surveys the alternative explanations that have been given of this paradox, mainly by various economic theories with some extension to political science, business administration, social psychology, moral philosophy and network analysis. It is argued that the diffusion of stock options and financial market-related incentives, supposed to discipline managers, have entitled them to convert their intrinsic power into remuneration and wealth, both at micro and macro level. This is the outcome of a de facto alliance of executives with financiers, who have exploited the long-run erosion of wage earners’ bargaining power. The article also discusses the possible reforms that could reduce the probability and the adverse consequences of CEO and top-manager opportunism: reputation, business ethic, legal sanctions, public auditing of companies, or a shift from a shareholder to a stakeholder conception.
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Опубликовано на портале: 24-03-2008
Richard Whitley Organization. 2003.  Vol. 10. No. 3. P. 481-501 . 
Organization studies become institutionalized as a distinct research field in North America in the 1960s as leading universities expanded to include the new behavioural and management sciences. In keeping with the prevailing image of science, it adopted an empiricist epistemology and an atomistic ontology that portrayed formal organizations as isolated, reactive hierarchies adapting to market selection mechanisms. The further expansion of higher education in North America and Europe in the 1970s and 1980s, especially in business and management studies, together with the failure of the logical empiricist research programme in the Anglo-Saxon philosophy of science and the decline of Fordism, encouraged considerable fragmentation of organization studies around rival frameworks. Additionally, the success of East Asian firms in many international markets and continued divergence of many European forms of capitalism from the US norm led to increasing interest in the role of institutional frameworks in structuring and reproducing competing forms of economic organization. This involved a radical reconceptualization of both the nature of formal organizations and their environments, which complemented developments in evolutionary and institutional economics. As a result, organizations have come to be seen as key mediating collectivities between national and international political-economic institutions and economic outcomes in different kinds of market economy.
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