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Что такое экономическая социология? Это не "междисциплинарные исследования". Это не "изучение социальных проблем в экономике". Это не проведение опросов населения. Это не маркетинговые исследования. Что же это? (подробнее...)

Статьи

Всего статей в данном разделе : 221

Опубликовано на портале: 17-11-2008
Sigurt Vitols WZB Discussion Paper. 1995.  No. 95 – 309.
This paper analyzes the contribution of the German banking system to the modernization of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in industry. The simultaneous greater relative importance of and relatively high wages in German SMEs appear to be paradoxical in terms of dual labor market theory, which claims that lower wages and greater flexibility in the use of labor are important for helping small firms compensate for their constrained access to capital, R&D and skills resources relative to large firms. This paper suggests that the successful modernization of the German small firm sector despite pressure from below from industry-level wage bargaining and strong job protection can be attributed to support from above in terms of an institutional infrastructure helping small firms overcome the organizational deficiencies they face relative to large firms. The decentralized provision of long-term finance and sophisticated financial services for the modernization of SMEs is enabled by a three-tiered federalist form of corporatist organization in the cooperative and savings banks sectors, in which smaller banks at the bottom tier of the organization receive access to refinancing on capital markets and specialized services -- normally only available to large banks -- through the upper tiers of the banking organization.
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Опубликовано на портале: 15-11-2007
Sigurt Vitols International Journal of Disclosure and Governance. 2005.  Vol. 2. No. 4. P. 357-367. 
Close links between banks and large companies have been seen as a key component of Germany’s corporate governance system. The recent sale of large shareholdings by banks raises the question of to what extent this system will converge to the US model of dispersed ownership. This paper argues that concentrated ownership will remain a key feature of this system. In addition, board-level representation of employees and the lack of a culture of independent directors are further factors supporting incremental change in Germany’s corporate governance system rather than wholesale convergance to the US model.
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Опубликовано на портале: 12-11-2008
Sigurt Vitols Industry and Innovation. 1997.  Vol. 4. No. 1. P. 15-36. 

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Опубликовано на портале: 18-12-2007
Ronald Philip Dore British Journal of Sociology. 1983.  Vol. 34. No. 4. P. 459-482. 
This article focuses on the predominance of obligated relational contracting in Japanese business. Consumer goods markets are highly competitive in Japan, but trade in intermediates, by contrast, is for the most part conducted within long-term trading relations in which goodwill give-and-take is expected to temper the pursuit of self-interest. Cultural preferences explain the unusual predominance of these relations in Japan, but they are in fact more common in Western economies than textbooks usually recognize. The growth of relational contracting in labour markets especially is, indeed, at the root of the rigidities supposedly responsible for contemporary stagflation. Japan shows that to sweep away these rigidities and give markets back their pristine vigor is not the only prescription for a cure of stagflation. The Japanese economy more than adequately compensates for the loss of allocative efficiency by achieving high levels of other kinds of efficiency. Relational contracts are just a way of trading off the short term loss involved in sacrificing a price advantage, against the insurance. As for relational contracting between enterprises, there are three things to be said. First, the relative security of such relations encourages investment in supplying firms. Second, the relationships of trust and mutual dependency make more for a rapid flow of information. Third, a by-product of the system is a general emphasis on quality.
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Опубликовано на портале: 25-03-2008
Robert Boyer PSE Working Papers. 2007.  No. 2007-43.
This article starts from the limits of the policies that assume a significant de-connection between antipoverty strategies and the logic of the growth regime and that mainly rely upon market mechanisms. By contrast, a branch of the new institutional economics argues that a complete set of coordinating mechanisms is constitutive of really existing economies and that they are more complementary than substitute. The Institutional Complementarity Hypothesis (ICH) may be useful for analyzing simultaneously the antipoverty policies and the viability of growth regimes. The different brands of capitalism are the outcome of complementary institutions concerning competition, labor market institutions, welfare and innovation systems. Generally, such configurations cannot be emulated by poor developing countries, but reviewing the preliminary findings of the UNRISD country case studies suggests some common features to all successful experiments. Basically, antipoverty policies are efficient when they create the equivalent of virtuous circles within which growth entitles antipoverty programs and conversely these programs sustain the speed and stability of growth. Two methods are proposed in order to detect possible complementarities and design accordingly economic policies: the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) on one side, national growth diagnosis on the other side. A special attention is devoted to the timing of policies and the role of policy regimes. A brief conclusion wraps up the major findings and proposes a research agenda.
Опубликовано на портале: 18-03-2008
Robert Boyer Economy and Society. 2005.  Vol. 34. No. 4. P. 509-557. 
The variety of capitalism school (VOC) and regulation theory (TR) are both analyses of the diversity of contemporary national economies. If VOC challenges the primacy of liberal market economies (LME) and stresses the existence of an alternative form, i.e. coordinated market economies (CME), TR starts from a long-term analysis of the transformation of capitalism in order to search for alternatives to the Fordist regime that emerged after the post-Second World War era. Both approaches make intensive use of international comparisons, challenge the role of market as the exclusive coordinating mechanism, and raise doubts about the existence of a ‘one best way’ for capitalism. Finally, they stress that globalization does deepen the competitive advantage associated with each institutional architecture. Nevertheless, their methodology differs: VOC stresses private firm governance, whereas TR considers the primacy of systemic and macroeconomic coherence. Whereas for VOC there exist only LME and CME, TR recurrently finds at least four brands of capitalism: market-led, meso-corporatist, social democrat and State-led. VOC seems to consider that the long-term stability of each capitalism can be challenged only by external shocks, but TR stresses the fact that the very success of a regulation mode ends up in a structural crisis, largely endogenous.
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Опубликовано на портале: 07-02-2008
Bruno Amable, Ernst Ekkehard, Stefano Palombarini Socio-Economic Review. 2005.  Vol. 3. No. 2. P. 311-330. 
This article presents a simple formal model of institutional complementarity (IC) applied to industrial relations, and develops two important aspects of IC. We first develop a formal definition for the static and dynamic aspects of IC and then relate these to the interaction between financial relations and the outcome of a wage bargaining between firms and trade unions. Trade unions and firms have the choice between a cooperative negotiation targeting at the long-term success of the firm and a conflictual relation targeting at maximizing the current share. One important determinant in this game will be the time horizon financial investors have as they influence the realization of future gains of cooperation between workers and firms. When financial investors are patient, a pareto-superior cooperative equilibrium can be attained. On the other hand, whenever one of the two bargaining parties gets too weak, the viability even of the long-term equilibrium is threatened.
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Опубликовано на портале: 24-11-2008
Gregory Jackson, Richard Deeg MPIfG, Discussion Paper. 2006.  No. 06/2 .
This essay reviews the development of approaches within the comparative capitalisms(CC) literature and points to three theoretical innovations which, taken together, define and distinguish these approaches as a group. First, national economies are characterized by distinct institutional configurations that generate a particular systemic “logic” of economic action. Second, the CC literature suggests a theory of comparative institutional advantage in which different institutional arrangements have distinct strengths and weaknesses for different kinds of economic activity. Third, the literature has been interpreted to imply a theory of institutional path dependence. Behind these unifying characteristics of the literature, however, lie a variety of analytical frameworks and typologies of capitalism. This paper reviews and compares these different frameworks by highlighting the fundamental distinctions among them and drawing out their respective contributions and limitations in explaining economic performance and institutional dynamics. The paper concludes that the way forward for this literature lies in developing a more dynamic view of individual institutions, the linkages between domains, and the role of politics and power.
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Опубликовано на портале: 25-03-2008
Robert Boyer Research & Regulation Working Papers. 2005.  No. 2005-1.
Why did CEOs remuneration exploded during the 90s and persisted to high levels, even after the bursting out of the Internet bubble? This article surveys the alternative explanations that have been given of this paradox mainly by various economic theories with some extension to political science, business administration, social psychology, moral philosophy, network analysis. Basically, it is argued that the diffusion of stock-options and financial market related incentives, that were supposed to discipline managers, have entitled them to convert their intrinsic power into remuneration and wealth, both at the micro and macro levels. This is the outcome of a de facto alliance of executives with financiers, who have thus exploited the long run erosion of wage earners’ bargaining power. At the company level, the power of top-managers derives from their control over financial information, and from a better knowledge than outsiders of the sources of company profitability. This power of top-managers is directly linked to the ability for a company to generate profits, via the complementarity of specific assets, at odds with the conventional neoclassical theory that assumes a cybernetic approach concerning the substitution of factors of production in response to the price signal of markets. Insider trading, the low sensitivity of CEOs compensation with respect to performance in large companies, the contradictory impact of mergers and acquisitions upon managers on one side shareholder on the other side, and the rarity of indexed stock-options are relevant empirical evidences of this intrinsic, micro founded, power of managers. Why financial scandals about excessive CEOs compensation took place at the end of the 90s and not before? A political economy approach complements the previous one and conveys the hypothesis that CEOs and CFOs have converted a part of their economic power into a political power, expressed at the society wide level. Generous stock-options grants derive from the impact of financial liberalisation, contemporary societies seem to accept more easily the widening of inequalities, whereas many governments tend to be pro-business: they lower the taxation of capital but they increase households taxation and weaken the redistributive role of tax and welfare systems. The article finally discusses the possible reforms that could reduce the probability and the adverse consequences of CEOs and top-managers opportunism: reputation, business ethic, legal sanctions, public auditing of companies, or shift from a shareholder to a stakeholder conception).
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Опубликовано на портале: 07-02-2008
Colin Crouch, Wolfgang Streeck, Richard Whitley, John L. Campbell Socio-Economic Review. 2007.  Vol. 5. No. 3. P. 527-567. 
At the 18th Annual Meeting on Socio-Economics in Trier 2006, an ‘Author Meets Critics’ session, organized by Christel Lane, President of SASE, debated John Campbell's book, ‘Institutional Change and Globalization’. Critics were Colin Crouch, Wolfgang Streeck and Richard Whitley; John Campbell responded. Subsequent to the session, the participants wrote up their statements for publication in Socio-Economic Review.
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Опубликовано на портале: 25-03-2008
Peter A. Hall, Kathleen Thelen
Paper prepared for presentation to the Europeanists Conference, Chicago, March 2006. Comparative political economists have become deeply interested in processes of institutional change, and especially in those taking place in response to the opening of world markets associated with ‘globalization’. They are asking a number of questions. When do the institutions of the political economy change? What factors drive change? Are changes in the international economy enforcing institutional convergence on the developed economies? We take up these issues with reference to one of the more influential frameworks devised to explain national differences in economic performance and policy, namely the ‘varieties of capitalism’ perspective now employed by a substantial number of scholars
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Опубликовано на портале: 24-03-2008
Richard Whitley Review of International Political Economy. 1998.  Vol. 5. No. 3. P. 445-481 . 
The increasing internationalization of economic activities in the late twentieth century has encouraged the belief that a new form of cross-national economic organization is becoming established and replacing existing forms of capitalism. Both the intensification of international competition and growth of managerial coordination across borders are seen as generating the convergence of currently separate business systems. However, the extent of such internationalization is less than often claimed, especially when compared to the late nineteenth century, and the processes by which it will lead to such convergence remain obscure. Since the different varieties of capitalist economic organization in Europe, Asia and the Americas developed over some time interdependently with dominant societal institutions, the ways in which they change as a result of internationalization are path dependent and reflect their historical legacies as well as current institutional linkages. Qualitative changes in central business system characteristics, such as ownership relations, non-ownership coordination and employment policies, are therefore unlikely to be rapid or to result solely from internationalization. Furthermore, the ways in which firms from different business systems internationalize reflect their varied natures and strategies which are unlikely to alter greatly unless key institutions alter. If multinational firms do develop different characteristics from national competitors, their impact on their domestic and host business systems will likewise depend on a number of strong conditions. Similarly, the establishment of a distinctive and dominant 'global' business system is only likely in very restrictive circumstances.
Опубликовано на портале: 29-10-2008
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny Journal of Financial Economics. 2000.  Vol. 58. No. 1-2. P. 3-27. 
Recent research has documented large differences among countries in ownership concentration in publicly traded firms, in the breadth and depth of capital markets, in dividend policies, and in the access of firms to external finance. A common element to the explanations of these differences is how well investors, both shareholders and creditors, are protected by law from expropriation by the managers and controlling shareholders of firms. We describe the differences in laws and the effectiveness of their enforcement across countries, discuss the possible origins of these differences, summarize their consequences, and assess potential strategies of corporate governance reform. We argue that the legal approach is a more fruitful way to understand corporate governance and its reform than the conventional distinction between bank-centered and market-centered financial systems.
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Опубликовано на портале: 29-10-2008
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny Journal of Finance. 2002.  Vol. 57. No. 3. P. 1147-1170. 
We present a model of the effects of legal protection of minority shareholders and of cash-flow ownership by a controlling shareholder on the valuation of firms. We then test this model using a sample of 539 large firms from 27 wealthy economies. Consistent with the model, we find evidence of higher valuation of firms in countries with better protection of minority shareholders and in firms with higher cash-flow ownership by the controlling shareholder.
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Опубликовано на портале: 25-03-2008
Robert Boyer Economy and Society. 2000.  Vol. 29. No. 1. P. 111-145 . 
The viability and desirability of a Ž nance-led growth regime is Ž rst assessed against the historical evidence about the many alternative regimes that have been proposed as successors to Fordism. A purely hypothetical model is then built by assembling various hypotheses derived from the observation of current American trends. The imposition of Ž nancial norms, such as shareholder value, requires a new and coherent architecture for the mode of governance of Ž rms, the form of competition, the wage labour nexus and the objectives of monetary policy, public budget and tax system. According to the model, any requirement for increased proŽ t has a variable macro-economic impact on wages and economic activity according to the size of accelerator effects and the relative importance of wage and proŽ t in income formation. The stability of an equity-based regime depends on monetary policy which controls Ž nancial bubbles and thus the diffusion of Ž nance may push the economy into a zone of structural instability. The next major Ž nancial crisis may originate in the USA whose economy approximates most closely to the model. But, the so-called American ‘new economy’ combines diverse but interdependent structural transformations: diffusion of Information and Communication Technologies, search for new rules for competition, increased  exibility in wages and employment, shift from manufacturing to services. Finance is an element in, but not the whole of, this complex emerging regime.
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