American Economic Review
1850 1958 1963 1964 1973 1975 1977 1980 1981 1982 1985 1986 1987 1988 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Опубликовано на портале: 06-02-2007Robert M. Costrell American Economic Review. 1994. Vol. 84. No. 4. P. 956-71.
The author models standards for educational credentials, such as high-school diplomas. Standard-setters maximize their conception of social welfare, knowing that utility-maximizing students choose whether to meet the standard. The author shows that more egalitarian policymakers set lower standards, the median voter would prefer higher standards (under symmetric distributions), and decentralization lowers standards (among identical communities). Optimal standards do not necessarily fall with increased student preference for leisure, deterioration of nonstudent inputs to education, or increased student heterogeneity. Superseding binary credentials by perfect information increases average achievement and social welfare for plausible degrees of heterogeneity, egalitarianism, and pooling under decentralization.
Опубликовано на портале: 05-02-2007Thomas J. Kane, Cecilia Elena Rouse American Economic Review. 1995. Vol. 85. No. 3. P. 600-614.
The paper examines labor-market returns to a two- and four-year college education. Analysis of the 1972 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth; Observation that the average person who attended a two-year college earned about 10-percent more than those without any college education; Comparison with the wages of those who attended a four-year college education.
Опубликовано на портале: 06-02-2007Julian Betts American Economic Review. 1998. Vol. 88. No. 1. P. 266-75.
The goal of this paper is to present the following finding: an egalitarian policy maker might prefer higher standards than would a policy maker whose goal was to maximize the sum of earnings. The result is based on the observation that if workers are differentiated with respect to ability, an increase in educational standards will increase the earnings of both the most-able and the least-able workers. The only workers whose earnings fall are those workers who after the increase fail to continue meeting the standard.