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Международная экономика является комплексной дисциплиной, изучающей взаимодействие экономических агентов разных стран. Традиционно экономическая дисциплина «Международная экономика» делится на 2 части: международная торговля и международные финансы, однако в раздел науки «Международная экономика» включают также международный бизнес, международные экономические отношения, международная политическая экономия и др. смежные дисциплины. (подробнее...)


Всего статей в данном разделе : 9

Опубликовано на портале: 03-12-2007
Gabriel Di Bella, Mark Lewis, Aurelie Martin IMF ,Working Paper. 2007.  No. 07/201.
Assessing a country's competitiveness routinely starts with an analysis of the real exchange rate. However, in low-income countries, empirical analysis of the real exchange rate is often subject to important limitations that seriously weaken the results. This paper summarizes the methodologies used to assess real exchange rate misalignments and discusses the range of obstacles common to low-income countries. Recognizing the importance of using a wide range of indicators for assessing competitiveness in low-income countries, the paper discusses alternative competitive measures and then proposes a template of indicators to allow for a systematic assessment of competitiveness in low-income countries. The template is then used to rank countries according to their competitiveness performance in 2006.
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Опубликовано на портале: 12-02-2007
Klaus J. Hopt, Patrick C. Leyens ECGI - Law Working Paper. 2004.  No. 18.
The struggle for efficient internal management control is the centre of the corporate governance debate in Europe since the incorporation of the Dutch Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie in 1602. Recent developments in Europe illustrate a trend towards specialised rules for listed companies and indicate growing convergence of internal control mechanisms independent of board structure. The revised Combined Code in the United Kingdom and also the French revised Principles of Corporate Governance, both of 2003, strengthen the presence of independent directors on one-tier boards in Europe. Another systemic break-through for the two-tier board model is the growing tendency to separate the positions of CEO and board chairman. For the German two-tier structure, the strengthening of the strategic role of the supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) by the new German Corporate Governance Code of 2002 means an attempt to incorporate a key advantage of the one-tier model. Similarly, the control duties of the Italian internal auditing committee (collegio sindacale) were extended by the Testo Unico of 1998 and bring the Italian second board closer to the German supervisory board. The common trend to stricter standards of independence is challenged in Germany by its rigid concept of co-determination and, to a lesser extent, by the more fl exible model of labour participation in France. Director’s duties and liabilities and also derivative actions are a focus of the reform debate in Germany since 1998 and are currently under review in the United Kingdom. After the Enron debacle the interplay between internal control devices and independent external auditing has become a major focus of interest in all countries considered. Driven by Anglo-Saxon codes of conduct audit committees today serve as a common denominator for good corporate governance. Though formal convergence is strong company organs in each country take on their own specifi c garment. Path dependent system development especially depends on shareholder structures and banking systems. The trend to greater structural fl exibility on board level is strongly triggered by the introduction of a threefold board model choice under the French Loi Nouvelle Régulations Economique of 2001 and under the Italian Vietti-Reform that is in force since January 2004.
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Опубликовано на портале: 16-04-2007
Jae-Seung Baek, Jun-Koo Kang, Kyung Suh Park Journal of Financial Economics. 2004.  Vol. 71. No. 2. P. 265-313. 
We show that during the 1997 Korean financial crisis, chaebol firms with higher ownership concentration by unaffiliated investors experience a smaller reduction in their share value. Firms with higher disclosure quality and alternative sources of external financing also suffer less. In contrast, chaebol firms with concentrated ownership by controlling family shareholders experience a larger drop in the value of their equity. Firms in which the controlling shareholders' voting rights exceed their cash flow rights, borrow more from the main banks, and are highly diversified also have lower returns. Finally, we find that downsizing (diversifying expansionary) actions during the crisis have a positive (negative) effect on the value of chaebol firms. Our results suggest that change in firm value during such a crisis is a function of firm-level differences in corporate governance measures and owner-manager incentives.
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Опубликовано на портале: 13-02-2007
Charles P. Oman OECD Working Papers. 2001.  No. 180.
Corporate governance matters for national development. Case studies of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, India, Malaysia and South Africa suggest that it has a role of growing importance to play in helping to increase the flow of financial capital to firms in developing countries. Equally important are the potential benefits of improved corporate governance for overcoming barriers, including the actions of vested interest groups, to achieving sustained productivity growth. Improved corporate governance, however, cannot be considered in isolation. In the financial sector, attention must also be given to measures to strengthen the banking sector, and a country’s financial institutions as a whole. In the “real” sector, close attention must be given to competition policy and sector–specific regulatory reform. Forces working in favour of improved corporate governance in developing countries include those operating both on the demand and on the supply side of domestic and international portfolio equity flows to corporations in those countries. Forces working against significantly improved corporate governance (which may nonetheless give lip service to the need for such improvement) include many dominant shareholders and other corporate insiders — in the private and public sectors — in entrenched distributional cartels. The heightened risk of regulatory capture in countries with clientelistic relationship–based (as opposed to rules–based) systems of governance reinforces the fact that good corporate governance requires good political governance, and vice–versa.
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Опубликовано на портале: 22-12-2007
Alex Segura-Ubiergo, Alejandro Simone, Sanjeev Gupta IMF, Working Paper. 2006.  No. 06/244.
This paper analyzes the relationship between fiscal adjustment and real GDP growth in a panel of 26 transition economies during 1992–2001. Unlike most previous studies using cross-country regressions, the paper finds a positive and statistically significant relationship between fiscal adjustment and growth that is robust to different model specifications and estimation methods. The paper also presents country experiences to delve deeper into the mechanisms that may underlie this statistical relationship.
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Опубликовано на портале: 03-12-2007
Horst Siebert Kiel Working Papers. 2006.  No. 1280.
This paper answers the question which developing countries have gained and which have lost in the international division of labor during the last thirty years. The indicators used are GDP per capita in constant purchasing power parity and relative distance to the United States. Nearly all developing countries have improved in absolute terms over the last thirty years; many, among them China and India with large populations, have also reduced their relative distance to the United States. The paper classifies developing countries and discusses impediments to economic development and core elements of a growth strategy.
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Опубликовано на портале: 16-11-2004
Daron K. Acemoglu, Jaume Ventura NBER Working Paper Series. 2001. 
We show that even in the absence of diminishing returns in production and techno-logical spillovers, international trade leads to a stable world income distribution. This is because specialization and trade introduce de facto diminishing returns: countries that accumulate capital faster than average experience declining export prices, depressing the rate of return to capital and discouraging further accumulation. Because of constant re-turns to capital accumulation from a global perspective time-series behavior of the world economy is similar to that of existing endogenous growth models, with the world growth rate determined by policies, savings and technologies. Because of diminishing returns to capital accumulation at the country level, the cross-sectional behavior of the world economy is similar to that of existing exogenous growth models: cross-country variation in economic policies, savings and technology translate into cross-country variation in incomes, and country dynamics exhibit conditional convergence as in the Solow-Ramsey model. The dispersion of the world income distribution is determined by the forces that shape the strength of the terms of trade effects the degree of openness to international trade and the extent of specialization. Finally, we provide evidence that countries accumulating faster experience a worsening in their terms of trade. Our estimates imply that, all else equal, a 1 percentage point faster growth is associated with approximately a 0.7 percentage point decline in the terms of trade.
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Опубликовано на портале: 03-12-2007
Felix Hammermann, Mark J. Flanagan IMF ,Working Paper. 2007.  No. 07/189.
Panel estimates based on 19 transition economies suggests that some central banks may aim at comparatively high inflation rates mainly to make up for, and to perhaps exploit, lagging internal and external liberalization in their economies. Out-of-sample forecasts, based on expected developments in the underlying structure of these economies, and assuming no changes in institutions, suggest that incentives may be diminishing, but not to the point where inflation levels below 5 percent could credibly be announced as targets. Greater economic liberalization would help reduce incentives for higher inflation, and enhancements to central bank independence could help shield these central banks from pressures.
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Опубликовано на портале: 18-02-2005
Александр Николаевич Моисеев, Галина Ивановна Курочкина
Галина Ивановна Курочкина – заместитель заведующего отделом стран Америки Министерства экономического развития и торговли РФ.
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