Всего статей в данном разделе : 6
Dependent Forms of Self-Employment in the UK: Identifying Workers on the Border between Employment and Self-Employment [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 03-12-2008Ulrike Mühlberger, René Böheim IZA Discussion Papers. 2006. No. 1963 .
We analyse the characteristics of workers who provide work on the basis of a civil or commercial contract, but who are dependent on or integrated into the firm for which they work. We argue that these dependent self-employed lose their rights under labour law, receive less favourable benefits from social security protection and are often beyond trade union representation and collective bargaining. Using data from the British Labour Force Survey we test two hypotheses: (1) Dependent self-employed workers are significantly different from both employees and (independent) self-employed individuals, thus forming a distinct group. (2) Dependent self-employed workers have lower labour market skills, less labour market attachment and, thus, less autonomy than self-employed workers. The data support our hypothesis that dependent self-employed workers are a distinct labour market group which differs from both employees and independent self-employed individuals. Men, older workers, those with low education and a low job tenure have greater odds of working in dependent self-employment than their counterparts. Our results suggest that dependent forms of self-employment are used by firms to increase labour flexibility.
From Relational Employment to Relational Contracting: Outsourcing and Dependent Self-employment in the British and Austrian Insurance Industry [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 03-12-2008Ulrike Mühlberger EUI Working Paper. 2002. No. 12.
Labour relations in business organisations are facing a profound change. This paper focuses on one specific change in labour relations, namely dependent outsourcing. Dependent outsourcing refers to contracts over products with little alternative use, where the subcontractor bears the entrepreneurial risk. From the perspective of the contractor, dependent outsourcing represents a business relationship to outsource the entrepreneurial risk. The lack or the high costs of an alternative use creates long-standing ties between the business partners, which allows them to overcome some of the difficulties with formal contracts and utilise their detailed knowledge of the situation to adapt to new contingencies as they arise. Drawing on 57 semi-structured interviews in the British and Austrian insurance industry, I identify the nature and logic of dependent outsourcing, deploying the dimensions control, dependency, support and incentives. Results reveal that the logic of dependent outsourcing is not straightforward. Instead, intensive field research shows widespread reasons for and against dependent outsourcing. In both countries, the changes in the cost structure, the passing of risk, the increase in productivity and the gains through specialisation are the most important reasons for tied agency. The reduction of control and mutual dependency are the main problems of insurance companies using tied agents or the key rationales why they do not deploy them. The paper highlights the hybrid position of dependent subcontractors between integration and non-integration. It is argued that blurring firm boundaries are pivotal to understand new developments in organisational governance.
Опубликовано на портале: 03-12-2008Ulrike Mühlberger ICER Working Paper. 2005. No. 22.
We observe that economic restructuring is significantly changing organizational governance. On the one hand, we witness an increase in mergers & acquisitions, which substitutes markets for hierarchies and, on the other hand, we see an increase in outsourcing and subcontracting activities, appearing to replace hierarchies by markets. However, there is evidence that an increasing part of outsourcing activities mix hierarchies with market forms of governance. The key argument of this paper is that firms have established governance structures based on markets, hierarchies and self-enforcing relational contracts so that they are able to keep a substantial amount of control despite of sourcing out labour. Furthermore, we argue that such hierarchical forms of outsourcing produce dependency. Using empirical evidence of the Austrian insurance industry, it is demonstrated that dependency is created, firstly, by the contractual restriction of alternative uses of resources, secondly, by support measures that bind the upstream party closely to the downstream party, thirdly, by relationship-specific investments made by the upstream party, and fourthly, by authority elements.
Опубликовано на портале: 03-12-2008Ulrike Mühlberger, Silvia Pasqua, CHILD Working Paper. 2006. No. 10.
Over the last decade Italy has seen a strong increase in the number of workers on the border between self-employment and employment. Depending on the data source the “parasubordinati”, i.e. workers with a “contract of continuous collaboration” (collaborators) represented between 1.8% (ISTAT, 2004) and 5.3% (Alteri and Oteri , 2004) of the Italian labour force. Since most of them work only for one company and are, moreover, strongly integrated into the firm of the contract partner, we argue that the Italian labour and social security law strongly discriminates against these workers who are, in fact, very close to employees. We investigate whether and in what respect the group of the collaborators differs from the group of employees and the group of the self-employed using the Italian Labour Force Survey (ILFS) of 2004 (4th quarter). Additionally, we analyse the short-term labour market transitions of collaborators to other labour market statuses. In contrast to other European countries, these collaborators are not low qualified workers, but young, highly educated professionals. At the same time the contracts of continuous collaboration are not a port of entry into the labour market nor do we find that these contracts are a vehicle to more stable jobs. However, they seem to be a possibility for women to work part-time.
Опубликовано на портале: 20-12-2007Ronald Philip Dore CEP Occasional Papers. 1996. No. 11.
It is not only in Japan that traditional employment systems are being called into question. It has become conventional wisdom on the OECD conference circuit that we are entering a new era of intensified global competition in which only the most “flexible” firms can survive. “Flexibility” and the elimination of rigidities, particularly labour market rigidities, became, in the mid-1980s, the keynote of prescriptions both for lack of competitiveness and for rising unemployment. Even earlier reservations about the desirability of preserving a “core” of stable, longserving, committed workers, differentiated from a flexible “periphery” have given way to prescriptions for wholesale “down-sizing”. There is a flexibility trade off. Concern with labour market flexibility -- especially managers’ ability to hire and fire at will -- is strengthened in the Anglo- Saxon economies by the inflexibility of the financial markets they face. Japanese firms, being more insulated from the short-term demands of shareholders, have hitherto been able to afford more “rigid” employment systems from which they gain the advantage of employee commitment and cooperative and flexible attitudes to work. But today the competitiveness/flexibility concern grows in Japan too. The lifetime employment/seniority-constrained pay and promotion system is under attack. Advocacy of change is common; assertions that wholesale change has already taken place almost equally common. The reasons are to be found partly in the objective situations of many firms after four years of recession, partly in a loss of self-confidence and a “resurgence of the American model”. Actual change seems in fact to be marginal, but there are a number of grounds for expecting change in the future: value change -- greater affluence, diminished work ethic, and diminished egalitarianism; the possible resurgence of shareholder power; the declining influence of unions; the declining “intellectual quality” of blue-collar and routine white-collar workers; increased inter-firm competition and the reduction of industry cartel understandings; slower growth; low-wage competition, particularly in future from China, and the “hollowing-out” response thereto. Those who have a stake in Japan’s “employee sovereignty” jimponshugi, and would be reluctant to see it slide into just another version of “shareholder sovereignty” Anglo-Saxon capitalism, might be expected to be proposing legislation to bring company law in line with current Japanese reality. Noone seems to be doing so.
Опубликовано на портале: 03-12-2008Ulrike Mühlberger, Silvia Pasqua, ICER Working Paper. 2006. No. 11.
The number of workers on the border between self-employment and employment strongly increased across Europe over the last decade. This paper investigates whether and in what respect these workers differ from employees and self-employed and analyses whether these work relationships are a stepping stone to more stable employment in the short-run using Italian data. Depending on the data source the para-subordinates represent between 1.8% and 5.3% of the Italian labour force. Since most of them work only for one company and are strongly integrated into the firm of the contract partner, we argue that labour and social security law discriminates against these workers who are in fact very close to employees. We find that they are not low qualified workers, but young, highly educated professionals. At the same time these contracts are not a port of entry into the labour market nor do we find that they are a vehicle to more stable jobs. However, they are a possibility for women to work part-time.