Всего статей в данном разделе : 48
Опубликовано на портале: 05-11-2008Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny Journal of Finance. 2000. Vol. 55. No. 1. P. 1-33 .
This paper outlines and tests two agency models of dividends. According to the "outcome model," dividends are paid because minority shareholders pressure corporate insiders to disgorge cash. According to the "substitute model," insiders interested in issuing equity in the future pay dividends to establish a reputation for decent treatment of minority shareholders. The first model predicts that stronger minority shareholder rights should be associated with higher dividend payouts; the second model predicts the opposite. Tests on a cross section of 4,000 companies from 33 countries with different levels of minority shareholder rights support the outcome agency model of dividends.
A survey of corporate governance [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 06-11-2008Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny Journal of Finance. 1997. Vol. 52. No. 2. P. 737-783.
This article surveys research on corporate governance, with special attention to the importance of legal protection of investors and of ownership concentration in corporate governance systems around the world
Опубликовано на портале: 06-10-2003Robert K. Rasmussen Vanderbilt Law Review. 1998. No. 51. P. 1679-1707.
Статья посвящена расширению экономического анализа законодательства о банкротстве (отождествляется с американским законом о банкротстве), базирующегося на предпосылках стандартной экономической теории. Автор предлагает провести экономический анализ банкротства, основываясь на предпосылках поведенческой экономики, точнее на модификации ими предпосылки о рациональности экономических агентов, которая лежит в основе экономического анализа банкротства.
Опубликовано на портале: 06-11-2008Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny
This paper presents two propositions about corruption. First, the structure of government institutions and of the political process are very important determinants of the level of corruption. In particular, weak governments that do not control their agencies experience very high corruption levels. Second, the illegality of corruption and the need for secrecy make it much more distortionary and costly than its sister activity, taxation. These results may explain why, in some less developed countries, corruption is so high and so costly to development.
Опубликовано на портале: 11-11-2008Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer Quarterly Journal of Economics. 2003. Vol. 118. No. 2. P. 453-517 .
In cooperation with Lex Mundi member law firms in 109 countries, we measure and describe the exact procedures used by litigants and courts to evict a tenant for nonpayment of rent and to collect a bounced check. We use these data to construct an index of procedural formalism of dispute resolution for each country. We find that such formalism is systematically greater in civil than in common law countries, and is associated with higher expected duration of judicial proceedings, less consistency, less honesty, less fairness in judicial decisions, and more corruption. These results suggest that legal transplantation may have led to an inefficiently high level of procedural formalism, particularly in developing countries.
Опубликовано на портале: 06-10-2003Richard A. Posner, Eric B. Rasmusen International Review of Law and Economics. 1999. No. 19. P. 369-382.
В статье затрагиваются центральные вопросы, связанные с социальными нормами – это, во-первых, то, каким образом нормы создаются и изменяются, а во-вторых, то, каким образом они принуждаются к исполнению. Санкции за отклонения от норм можно разбить на категории следующим образом: автоматические, вина, стыд, информационные, порождающие двусторонние издержки и порождающие издержки для нескольких сторон. Выбор санкции напрямую связан с проблемами создания и изменения норм. Авторы используют анализ создания, изменения и принуждения к исполнению норм для исследования возможных действий государства по продвижению желаемых норм и по пресечению нежелательных. Авторы приходят к выводу, что возможность таких действий ограничивается сложностью предсказания их результата.
Do Institutions Cause Growth? [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 05-11-2008Edward Ludwig Glaeser, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer Journal of Economic Growth. 2004. Vol. 9. No. 3. P. 271-303.
We revisit the debate over whether political institutions cause economic growth, or whether, alternatively, growth and human capital accumulation lead to institutional improvement. We find that most indicators of institutional quality used to establish the proposition that institutions cause growth are constructed to be conceptually unsuitable for that purpose. We also find that some of the instrumental variable techniques used in the literature are flawed. Basic OLS results, as well as a variety of additional evidence, suggest that (a) human capital is a more basic source of growth than are the institutions, (b) poor countries get out of poverty through good policies, often pursued by dictators, and (c) subsequently improve their political institutions.
Family firms [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 06-11-2008Mike Burkart, Fausto Panunzi, Andrei Shleifer Journal of Finance. 2003. Vol. 58. No. 5. P. 2167-2201 .
We present a model of succession in a firm owned and managed by its founder. The founder decides between hiring a professional manager or leaving management to his heir, as well as on what fraction of the company to float on the stock exchange. We assume that a professional is a better manager than the heir, and describe how the founder's decision is shaped by the legal environment. This theory of separation of ownership from management includes the Anglo-Saxon and the Continental European patterns of corporate governance as special cases, and generates additional empirical predictions consistent with cross-country evidence.
Government ownership of banks [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 05-11-2008Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer Journal of Finance. 2002. Vol. 57. No. 1. P. 265-301.
We assemble data on government ownership of banks around the world. The data show that such ownership is large and pervasive, and higher in countries with low levels of per capita income, backward financial systems, interventionist and inefficient governments, and poor protection of property rights. Higher government ownership of banks in 1970 is associated with slower subsequent financial development and lower growth of per capita income and productivity. This evidence supports "political" theories of the effects of government ownership of firms.
Опубликовано на портале: 29-10-2008Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny Journal of Financial Economics. 2000. Vol. 58. No. 1-2. P. 3-27.
Recent research has documented large differences among countries in ownership concentration in publicly traded firms, in the breadth and depth of capital markets, in dividend policies, and in the access of firms to external finance. A common element to the explanations of these differences is how well investors, both shareholders and creditors, are protected by law from expropriation by the managers and controlling shareholders of firms. We describe the differences in laws and the effectiveness of their enforcement across countries, discuss the possible origins of these differences, summarize their consequences, and assess potential strategies of corporate governance reform. We argue that the legal approach is a more fruitful way to understand corporate governance and its reform than the conventional distinction between bank-centered and market-centered financial systems.
Опубликовано на портале: 29-10-2008Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny Journal of Finance. 2002. Vol. 57. No. 3. P. 1147-1170.
We present a model of the effects of legal protection of minority shareholders and of cash-flow ownership by a controlling shareholder on the valuation of firms. We then test this model using a sample of 539 large firms from 27 wealthy economies. Consistent with the model, we find evidence of higher valuation of firms in countries with better protection of minority shareholders and in firms with higher cash-flow ownership by the controlling shareholder.
Опубликовано на портале: 06-11-2008Andrei Shleifer, D. Wolfenzon Journal of Financial Economics. 2002. Vol. 66. No. 1. P. 3-27 .
We present a simple model of an entrepreneur going public in an environment with poor legal protection of outside shareholders. The model incorporates elements of Becker's (J. Political Econ. 106 (1968) 172) "crime and punishment" framework into a corporate finance environment of Jensen and Meckling (J. Financial Econ. 3 (1976) 305). We examine the entrepreneur's decision and the market equilibrium. The model is consistent with a number of empirical regularities concerning the relation between investor protection and corporate finance. It also sheds light on the patterns of capital flows between rich and poor countries and on the politics of reform of investor protection.
Опубликовано на портале: 06-11-2008Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny Journal of Finance. 1997. Vol. 52. No. 3. P. 1131-1150.
Using a sample of 49 countries, we show that countries with poorer investor protections, measured by both the character of legal rules and the quality of law enforcement, have smaller and narrower capital markets. These findings apply to both equity and debt markets. In particular, French civil law countries have both the weakest investor protections and the least developed capital markets, especially as compared to common law countries.
Part-time Workers in the Multiple Retail Sector: Small Change from Employment Protection Legislation? (Временные работники в сфере розничной торговли: влияет ли на них хоть как-то законодательство о защите занятости?) [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 17-09-2004Alison Balchin Employee Relations. 1994. Vol. 16. No. 7.
Draws on a small research study undertaken in the retail industry, providing a very timely consideration of the choices and circumstances of those who work on a part-time basis. Considers the reasons given by workers for choosing part-time work, the costs involved and the extent to which part-time workers are aware of these when making their decision. The research considers the role of trade unions in enhancing awareness of legal entitlements in view of the recent House of Lords ruling.
Опубликовано на портале: 19-11-2004Oriana Bandiera, James Anderson
Private enforcement of property rights is ubiquitous. Is it socially efficient? What constraints does potential private provision of enforcement impose on efficient state policy? At times private enforcement is cartelized; at others it is competitive. Which form is more efficient? We provide answers in a model of the private enforcement of property rights.