Journal of Finance
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Опубликовано на портале: 03-10-2003David J. Denis, Diane K. Denis, Atulya Sarin Journal of Finance. 1997. Vol. 52. No. 1. P. 135-160.
We provide evidence on the agency cost explanation for corporate diversification. We find that the level of diversification is negatively related to managerial equity ownership and to the equity ownership of outside blockholders. In addition, we report that decreases in diversification are associated with external corporate control threats, financial distress, and management turnover. These findings suggest that agency problems are responsible for firms maintaining value-reducing diversification strategies and that the recent trend toward increased corporate focus is attributable to market disciplinary forces.
A New Look at the Monday Effect [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 25-10-2007Ko Wang, John Erickson, Yuming Li Journal of Finance. 1997. Vol. 52. No. 5. P. 2171-2186.
It is well documented that expected stock returns vary with the day-of-the-week (the Monday or weekend effect). In this article we show that the well-known Monday effect occurs primarily in the last two weeks (fourth and fifth weeks) of the month. In addition, the mean Monday return of the first three weeks of the month is not significantly different from zero. This result holds for most of the subperiods during the 1962-1993 sampling period and for various stock return indexes. The monthly effect reported by Ariel (1987) and Lakonishok and Smidt (1988) cannot fully explain this phenomenon.
A survey of corporate governance [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 06-11-2008Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny Journal of Finance. 1997. Vol. 52. No. 2. P. 737-783.
This article surveys research on corporate governance, with special attention to the importance of legal protection of investors and of ownership concentration in corporate governance systems around the world
Опубликовано на портале: 06-11-2008Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny Journal of Finance. 1997. Vol. 52. No. 3. P. 1131-1150.
Using a sample of 49 countries, we show that countries with poorer investor protections, measured by both the character of legal rules and the quality of law enforcement, have smaller and narrower capital markets. These findings apply to both equity and debt markets. In particular, French civil law countries have both the weakest investor protections and the least developed capital markets, especially as compared to common law countries.
Опубликовано на портале: 03-12-2007Mark M. Carhart Journal of Finance. 1997. Vol. 52. No. 1. P. 57-82.
Using a sample free of survivor bias, I demonstrate that common factors in stock returns and investment expenses almost completely explain persistence in equity mutual funds' mean and risk-adjusted returns. Hendricks, Patel and Zeckhauser's (1993) "hot hands" result is mostly driven by the one-year momentum effect of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), but individual funds do not earn higher returns from following the momentum stratégy in stocks. The only significant persistence not explained is concentrated in strong underperformance by the worst-return mutual funds. The results do not support the existence of skilled or informed mutual fund portfolio managers