Administrative Science Quarterly
Выпуск N4 за 1999 год
Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002Ann E. Tenbrunsel, David M. Messick Administrative Science Quarterly. 1999. Vol. 44. No. 4. P. 684-707.
Three studies are used to examine how surveillance and sanctioning systems affect cooperative behavior and dilemma situations. The first two studies demonstrate that a weak sanctioning system results in less cooperation and no sanctioning system; furthermore, results from the second study suggest that sanctions affect the type of decision people perceive they are making, prompting them to see it as a business rather than an ethical decision. The results from the studies are used to develop a theoretical model that postulates that the relationship between sanctions in cooperation is due to both the signaling effect, in which sanctions influence the type of decision that is perceived to be made, and a processing effect, in which the decision processing, including whether or not the strength of the sanction is considered, depends on the decision frame evoked. A third study provides support for the processing-effect hypothesis.