Journal of Economic Theory
Выпуск N2 за 1982 год
Reputation and Imperfect Information [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 31-01-2007David M. Kreps, Robert B. Wilson Journal of Economic Theory. 1982. Vol. 27. No. 2. P. 253-279.
A common observation in the informal literature of economics (and elsewhere) is that is multistage games, players may seek early in the game to acquire a reputation for being tough or benevolent or something else. But this phenomenon is not observed in some formal game-theoretic analyses of finite games, such as Selten's finitely repeated chain-store game or in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma. We reexamine Selten's model, adding to it a small amount of imperfect (or incomplete) information about players' payoffs, and we find that this addition is sufficient to give rise to the reputation effect that one intuitively expects.