Journal of International Economics
Опубликовано на портале: 22-10-2007Avinash K. Dixit, Luisa Lambertini Journal of International Economics. 2003. Vol. 60. No. 2. P. 235-247.
We consider the interaction between the monetary policy in a monetary union, and the separate fiscal policies of the member countries. We use a Barro–Gordon-type model extended to many countries and fiscal policies. Each country’s fiscal policies inflict externalities on other countries, and the common monetary policy has its time-consistency problem. But if the two types of policymakers agree about the ideal levels of output and inflation, then this ideal is attained despite disagreements about the weights of the objectives, despite ex post monetary accommodation to fiscal profligacy, without fiscal coordination, without monetary commitment, and for any order of moves.
Опубликовано на портале: 25-10-2007Xenia Matschke Journal of International Economics. 2003. No. 61. P. 209-223.
This paper investigates the equivalence of optimal import tariffs and quotas in a Cournot duopoly model when firms have more information about demand than the domestic government. The author considers a screening model in which the government offers the domestic firm different contracts from which to choose. She shows that the availability and cost of obtaining correct information from the firm depends upon the choice of trade policy instrument. Asymmetric information thus destroys the equivalence of tariffs and quotas, which prevails under complete information, and has a profound impact on how government, firms, and consumers rank different trade policy instruments.