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В разделе собрана информация о статьях по экономике, социологии и менеджменту. Во многих случаях приводятся полные тексты статей. (подробнее...)

Journal of Political Economy

Опубликовано на портале: 31-03-2003
Lester G. Telser Journal of Political Economy. 1964.  Vol. 72. P. 537-562. 
Предмет статьи - рассмотрение утверждения о несовместимости рекламы, как элемента стратегии фирмы в конкурентной борьбе, с конкуренцией как теоретической конструкцией. Работа основывается на анализе эмпирических данных (показатели концентрации, доли рынка, размеры фирм) для компаний и товаров с разным уровнем расходов на рекламную деятельность. Статья, основным выводом которой стало утверждение, что обратная зависимость между степенью конкуренции и интенсивностью рекламы не имеет под собой оснований, послужила основой для многих последующих работ в этой области.
ресурс содержит полный текст, либо отрывок из него
Опубликовано на портале: 31-03-2003
P. Nelson Journal of Political Economy. 1974.  Vol. 82. No. 4. P. 729-754. 
This paper tries to show how the major features of the behavior of advertising can be explained by advertising's information function. For search qualities advertising provides direct information about the characteristics of a brand. For experience qualities the most important information conveyed by advertising is simply that the brand advertises. This contrast in advertising by these qualities leads to significant differences in its behavior. How does advertising provide information to the consumer? The producer in his advertising is not interested directly in providing information for consumers. He is interested in selling more of his product. Subject to a few constraints, the advertising message says anything the seller of a brand wishes. A mechanism is required to make the selling job of advertising generate information to the consumer. [Авторский текст]
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Опубликовано на портале: 11-11-2004
Eugene F. Fama Journal of Political Economy. 1980.  Vol. 88. No. 2. P. 288-307. 
This paper attempts to explain how the separation of security ownership and control, typical of large corporations, can be an efficient form of economic organization. We first set aside the presumption that a corporation has owners in any meaningful sense. The entrepreneur is also laid to rest, at least for the purposes of the large modern corporation. The two functions usually attributed to the entrepreneur--management and risk bearing--are treated as naturally separate factors within the set of contracts called a firm. The firm is disciplined by competition from other firms, which forces the evolution of devides for efficiently monitoring the performance of the entire team and of its individual members. Individual participants in the firm, and in particular its managers, face both the discipline and opportunities provided by the markets for their services, both within and outside the firm.
ресурс содержит полный текст, либо отрывок из него ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию
Опубликовано на портале: 15-12-2002
David C. Ribar, Mark O. Wilhelm Journal of Political Economy. 2002.  Vol. 110. No. 2. P. 425-457. 
This study theoretically and empirically examines altruistic and joy-of-giving motivations underlying contributions to charitable activities. The theoretical analysis shows that in an economy with an infinitely large number of donors, impurely altruistic preferences lead to either asymptotically zero or complete crowd-out. The paper then establishes conditions on preferences that are sufficient to yield zero crowd-out in the limit. These conditions are fairly weak and quite plausible. An empirical representation of the model is estimated using a new 198692 panel of donations and government funding from the United States to 125 international relief and development organizations. Besides directly linking sources of public and private support, the econometric analysis controls for unobserved institution-specific factors, institution-specific changes in leadership, year-to-year changes in need, and expenditures by related organizations. The estimates show little evidence of crowd-out from either direct public or related private sources. Thus, at the margin, donations to these organizations appear to be motivated solely by joy-of-giving preferences. In addition to addressing the basic question of motives behind charitable giving, the results help explain the existing disparity between econometric and experimental crowd-out estimates.
Опубликовано на портале: 06-02-2003
Robert L. Bish, Patrick D. O'Donoghue Journal of Political Economy. 1970.  Vol. 78. No. 6. P. 1367-1371. 
The recent literature has contained considerable discussion of conditions under which socially optimal levels[1] of public-goods consumption will be achieved through consumer cooperation.[2] However, analyses in this field have neglected one important problem: the potential monopsony situation which arises when consumers cooperate to articulate demand. In several instances neglect of this problem by examination of only constant-cost situations has led to erroneous conclusions. Sharp and Escarraz (1964) conclude that voluntary bargaining among consumers will lead to the optimal output, when they have in fact considered only the special case of perfectly elastic supply. In The Theory of Public Finance (1959) Musgrave also examines only constant-cost situations while stating that "both figures ... may be adapted to conditions of increasing cost without changing the principle of our argument" (p. 76, n. 2). More recently, Buchanan, in The Demand and Supply of Public Goods (1968), makes the constant-cost assumption and consequently arrives at an erroneous conclusion when he states: "At equilibrium, the marginal rates of substitution between the public good and the numeraire private good, summed over all persons in the group, must equal the marginal cost of supplying the public good, again expressed in units of the numeraire. This statement of the necessary marginal conditions for equilibrium in a world that contains a public good is fully general, and holds without qualification" (p. 43). In this analysis we outline the equilibrium outputs of public goods which result from consumer cooperation under conditions of both constant and increasing costs and discuss some of their implications. [Авторский текст]
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Опубликовано на портале: 19-11-2005
Kelvin J. Lancaster Journal of Political Economy. 1966.  Vol. 74. No. 2. P. 132-157. 
The theory of consumer behavior in deterministic situations as set out by, say, Debreu (1959, 1960) or Uzawa (1960) is a thing of great aesthetic beauty, a jewel set in a glass case. The product of a long process of refinement from the nineteenth-century utility theorists through Slutsky and Hicks-Allen to the economists of the last twenty-five years,[1] it has been shorn of all irrelevant postulates so that it now stands as an example of how to extract the minimum of results from the minimum of assumptions. In this model we have extended into consumption theory activity analysis, which has proved so penetrating in its application to production theory. The crucial assumption in making this application has been the assumption that goods possess, or gire rise to, multiple characteristics in fixed proportions and that it is these characteristics, not goods themselves, on which the consumer's preferences are exercised. The result, as this brief survey of the possibilities has shown, is a model very many rimes richer in heuristic explanatory and predictive power than the con- ventional model of consumer behavior and one that deals easily with those many common-sense characteristics of actual behavior that have found no place in traditional exposition. This paper is nothing more than a condensed presentation of some of the great number of possible ways in which the model can be used. It is hoped that a door has been opened to a new, rich treasure house of ideas for the future development of the most refined and least powerful branch of economic theory, the theory of the consumer himself. [Авторский текст]
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Опубликовано на портале: 12-05-2004
Paul J. McNulty Journal of Political Economy. 1967.  Vol. 75. No. 4. P. 395-399. 
Focuses on the history of perfect competition with economist Adam Smith's treatment of the subject. Concept of Smith on competition through his acquaintance with the economic literature of his time; Competition as a familiar concept of economic reasoning; Perfection of the Smithian concept of competition by the economic theorists.
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Опубликовано на портале: 13-04-2004
Ray C. Fair Journal of Political Economy. 1978.  Vol. 86. P. 45-61. 
In this paper a model is developed that explains the allocation of an individual's time among work and two types of leisure activities: time spent with spouse, and time spent with paramour. Data from two recent magazine surveys are available that can be used to test the predictions of the model regarding the determinants of time spent with paramour. The results of estimating the equation explaining time spent with paramour, by the Tobit estimator, are generally supportive of the model, although more evidence is needed before any definitive conclusions can be drawn. The model can also be applied to the allocation of time among other types of leisure activities.
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Опубликовано на портале: 17-03-2005
Douglas W. Diamond, Philip H. Dybvig Journal of Political Economy. 1983.  Vol. 91. No. 3. P. 401-419. 
This paper shows that bank deposit contracts can provide allocations superior to those of exchange markets, offering an explanation of how banks subject to runs can attract deposits. Investors face privately observed risks which lead to a demand for liquidity. Traditional demand deposit contracts which provide liquidity have multiple equilibria, one of which is a bank run. Bank runs in the model cause real economic damage, rather than simply reflecting other problems. Contracts which can prevent runs are studied, and the analysis shows that there are circumstances when government provision of deposit insurance can produce superior contracts.
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Опубликовано на портале: 07-02-2003
Mordecai Ezekiel, Kathrin H. Wylie Journal of Political Economy. 1940.  Vol. 48. No. 6. P. 777-822. 
В статье на основе эмпирического материала по стальной промышленности США анализируется связь между величиной выпуска, размером затрат и степенью задействования производственных мощностей.
ресурс содержит полный текст, либо отрывок из него
Опубликовано на портале: 08-12-2003
David Card, Alan B. Krueger Journal of Political Economy. 1992.  Vol. 100. No. 1. P. 1-40. 
This paper estimates the effects of school quality--measured by the pupil/teacher ratio, average term length, and relative teacher pay--on the rate of return to education for men born between 1920 and 1949. Using earnings data from the 1980 census, we find that men who were educated in states with higher-quality schools have a higher return to additional years of schooling. Rates of return are also higher for individuals from states with better-educated teachers and with a higher fraction of female teachers. Holding constant school quality measures, however, we find no evidence that parental income or education affects average state-level rates of return.
Опубликовано на портале: 08-12-2003
Edward Lazear Journal of Political Economy. 1977.  Vol. 85. No. 3. P. 569-598. 
This paper attempts to determine whether the relationship between education and income results because schooling allows individuals to earn higher income or because higher income individuals purchase more of all normal goods, including schooling. Education is treated as a joint product, producing potential wage gains and utility simultaneously. The framework permits estimation of the rental price of a unit of education, net of consumption effects. The major finding is that education does causally produce income. By moving from 0 years of schooling to 12 years, the mean individual approximately triples his wealth. More surprising is that education is a bad." Individuals stop short of acquiring the wealth-maximizing level of education because of the disutility associated with school attendance.
Опубликовано на портале: 31-03-2003
Peter J. Lloyd Journal of Political Economy. 1969.  Vol. 77. No. 1. P. 21-34. 
Focuses on the characteristics of early production functions. Simultaneous occurrence of geometric and arithmetic series in the theory; Use of the parametric equations to solve for functions; Marginal productivity theory of factor pricing. (Из Ebsco) В статье дается обзор вклада Тюнена в концепцию производственной функции.
ресурс содержит полный текст, либо отрывок из него
Опубликовано на портале: 31-03-2003
Arthur H. Leigh Journal of Political Economy. 1974.  Vol. 82. No. 3. P. 578-586. 
Focuses on the contributions of economist Frank H. Knight on improving the economic theory. Significance of Knight's theory of profit and capital; Effectiveness of a perfectly competitive market structure to achieve optimal allocative solutions; Emphasis on the universality of the choice problem imposed by scarcity. (From Ebsco)
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Опубликовано на портале: 28-04-2004
Gary Stanley Becker Journal of Political Economy. 1962.  P. 9-49. 
Публикация главы из книги Г. Беккера "Человеческий капитал", в которой рассматривается проблематика инвестиций в повышение квалификации работника через дополнительное образование. Описывается несколько схем оплаты дополнительного образования, дается оценка их эффективности и динамика заработной платы работника в зависимости от выбранной схемы. Русский перевод главы см.: "США: экономика, политика, идеология", № 11, ноябрь, 1993 г.
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