Всего публикаций в данном разделе: 5
Odious Debt [книги]
Опубликовано на портале: 11-01-2003Michael Kremer, Seema Jayachandran
Some argue that sovereign debt incurred without the consent of the people and not for their benefit, such as that of apartheid South Africa, should be considered odious and not transferable to successor governments. We argue that an institution that truthfully announced whether regimes are odious could create an equilibrium in which successor governments suffer no reputational loss from failure to repay odious debt and hence creditors curtail odious lending. Equilibria with odious lending could be eliminated by amending creditor country laws to prevent seizure of assets for failure to repay odious debt and restricting foreign assistance to countries not repaying odious debt. Shutting down the borrowing capacity of illegitimate regimes can be viewed as a form of economic sanction and has two advantages over most sanctions: it helps rather than hurts the population, and it does not create incentives for evasion by third parties. However, an institution empowered to assess regimes might falsely term debt odious if it favored debtors, and if creditors anticipate this, they would not make loans to legitimate governments. An institution empowered only to declare future lending to a particular government odious would have greater incentives to judge truthfully. A similar approach could be used to reduce moral hazard associated with World Bank and IMF loans.
Опубликовано на портале: 30-04-2003Gregory N. Mankiw
Изд-во: Worth Publishers, 2002
Интерактивный тест представляет собой набор вопросов и несколько вариантов ответов, из которых необходимо выбрать один правильный. Вопросы могут быть как теоретическими, так и практическими, требующими незначительных вычислений. По каждой теме учебника составлены отдельные задания. Для прохождения теста необходимо иметь знания на промежуточном (макроэкономика-2) уровне. Успешное выполнение большей части заданий не требует обязательного прочтения учебника Мэнкью, т.к. тест содержит общие для макроэкономической теории вопросы. Ответив на все вопросы, пользователь может посмотреть свой результат, верный ответ и ссылки на те разделы учебника, которые содержат пояснения к ответам.
Опубликовано на портале: 01-09-2003Giancarlo Corsetti, Nouriel Roubini
This paper analyzes optimal spending, tax and financial policies in models of endogenous growth where public spending is productive. We extend previous work in four directions. First, we analyze optimal policies when the government is allowed to borrow and lend, rather than being restricted to run a balanced budget in every period. Second, we develop a model with a separate human capital accumulation sector. Therefore, the properties of optimal policies depend on whether government spending affects the productivity of the final goods sector or the human capital accumulation sector. Third, we consider the policy implications of alternative assumptions about which factor of production benefits from the external effects of productive public goods. Fourth, we study the implications of restrictions on the menu of tax instruments available to the policy maker. We contrast optimal tax rates on human and physical capital under different assumptions on technology and distribution. We analyze the welfare properties of public debt and assets.
Опубликовано на портале: 11-01-2003Andres Velasco, Eric Parrado
Using an optimizing model we derive the optimal monetary and exchange rate policy for a small stochastic open economy with imperfect competition and short run price rigidity. The optimal monetary policy has an exact closed-form solution and is obtained using the utility function of the representative home agent as welfare criterion. The optimal policy depends on the source of stochastic disturbances affecting the economy, much as in the literature pioneered by Poole (1970). Optimal monetary policy reacts to domestic and foreign disturbances. If the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption is less than one, as is likely to be the case empirically, the optimal exchange rate policy implies a dirty float: interest rate shocks from abroad are met partially by adjusting home interest rates, and partially by allowing the exchange rate to move. This optimal pattern may help rationalize the observed fear of floating.
Опубликовано на портале: 29-08-2003Robert J. Barro
A tax-smoothing objective is used to assess the optimal consumption of public debt with respect to maturity and contingencies. This objective motivates the government to make its debt payout contingent on the levels of public outlay and the tax base. If these contingencies are present, but asset prices of non-contingent indexed debt are stochastic, then full tax smoothing dictates an optimal maturity structure of the non-contingent debt. If the certainty-equivalent outlays are the same for each period then the government should guarantee equal real payouts in each period, that is, the debt takes the form of indexed consols. This structure insulates the government's budget constraint from unpredictable variations in the market prices of indexed bonds of various maturities. If contingent debt is precluded, then the government may want to depart from a consol maturity structure to exploit covariances among public outlay, the tax base, and the term structure of real interest rates. However, if moral hazard is the reason for the preclusion of contingent debt, then this consideration also deters exploitation of these covariances and tends to return the optimal solution to the consol maturity structure. The issue of nominal bonds may allow the government to exploit the covariances among public outlay, the tax base, and the rate of inflation. But if moral-hazard explains the absence of contingent debt, then the same reasoning tends to make nominal debt issue undesirable. The bottom line is that an optimal-tax approach to public debt favors bonds that are indexed and long term.