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Всего публикаций в данном разделе: 63

Авторы:
А Б ВГ Д Е ЖЗИ ЙК Л М Н О П Р С Т У ФХ ЦЧ Ш ЩЭЮЯ
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
 
Названия:
все А БВ Г Д ЕЖЗ И ЙК ЛМ Н О П Р С Т У ФХЦ ЧШЩЭ ЮЯ
AB C D E F G H I JKL M N O P Q R S T U V W XY Z
 

Опубликовано на портале: 29-11-2003
Stephan Cramon-Taubadel, J. Meyer
2002
In this paper we survey the literature on asymmetric price transmission. This literature contains a substantial share of publications by agricultural economists. After classifying the different types of asymmetric price transmission in section 2, we describe the explanations for asymmetric price transmission that have been proposed in section 3. In section 4 we focus on the econometric techniques used to quantify asymmetry. Section 5 concludes with a discussion of outstanding methodological problems and suggestions for future research. Our main conclusion is that the existing literature is far from being unified or conclusive, and that a great deal of work remains to be done. A wide variety of often conflicting theories of and empirical tests for asymmetry co-exist in the literature. Furthermore, existing tests are not discerning in the sense that they as a rule to do not make it possible to choose between competing explanations for asymmetry on the basis of empirical results. Therefore, after more than three decades of work, a considerable need for further research remains, and it would appear premature to draw far reaching conclusions for theory and policy on the basis of work to date.
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Опубликовано на портале: 09-12-2003
Jean Tirole, Jean-Jacques Laffont
Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1993, 705 с.
More then just a textbook, A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation will guide economists' research on regulation for years to come. It makes a difficult and large literature of the new regulatory economics accessible to the average graduate student, while offering insights into the theoretical ideas and stratagems not available elsewhere. Based on their pathbreaking work in the application of principal-agent theory to questions of regulation, Laffont and Tirole develop a synthetic approach, with a particular, though not exclusive, focus on the regulation of natural monopolies such as military contractors, utility companies, and transportation authorities.

The book's clear and logical organization begins with an introduction that summarizes regulatory practices, recounts the history of thought that led to the emergence of the new regulatory economics, sets up the basic structure of the model, and previews the economic questions tackled in the next seventeen chapters. The structure of the model developed in the introductory chapter remains the same throughout subsequent chapters, ensuring both stability and consistency. The concluding chapter discusses important areas for future work in regulatory economics.

Each chapter opens with a discussion of the economic issues, an informal description of the applicable model, and an overview of the results and intuition. It then develops the formal analysis, including sufficient explanations for those with little training in information economics or game theory. Bibliographic notes provide a historical perspective of developments in the area and a description of complementary research. Detailed proofs are given of all major conclusions, making the book valuable as a source of modern research techniques. There is a large set of review problems at the end of the book.
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Опубликовано на портале: 12-12-2003
Alastair Bailey, Xavier Irz, Kelvin Balcombe
Durban, 2003
The measurement of the impact of technical change has received significant attention within the economics literature. One popular method of quantifying the impact of technical change is the use of growth accounting index numbers. However, in a recent article Nelson and Pack (1999) criticise the use of such index numbers in situations where technical change is likely to be biased in favour of one or other inputs. In particular they criticise the common approach of applying observed cost shares, as proxies for partial output elasticities, to weight the change in quantities which they claim is only valid under Hicks neutrality. Recent advances in the measurement of product and factor biases of technical change developed by Balcombe et al (2000) provide a relatively straight-forward means of correcting product and factor shares in the face of biased technical progress.

This paper demonstrates the correction of both revenue and cost shares used in the construction of a TFP index for UK agriculture over the period 1953 to 2000 using both revenue and cost function share equations appended with stochastic latent variables to capture the bias effect. Technical progress is shown to be biased between both individual input and output groups. Output and input quantity aggregates are then constructed using both observed and corrected share weights and the resulting TFPs are compared. There does appear to be some significant bias in TFP if the effect of biased technical progress is not taken into account when constructing the weights.
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