Экономика » Экономика отраслевых рынков » Аграрная экономика » Рынки агропродовольственной продукции
Всего публикаций в данном разделе: 2
Regional (Dis-)Integration of Russia’s Agro-food Markets / Russia’s Agro-Food Sector: Towards Truly Functioning Markets. Edited by P. Wehrheim, K. Frohberg, E. Serova, J. von Braun. [книги]
Опубликовано на портале: 04-01-2004Arnim Kuhn
Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000, 203-219 с.
This paper examines the extent of interregional integration of Russian food markets from different perspectives. Though food price levels in Russia are converging after the period of hyperinflation, remote regions like the Far East seem to be on a different price path. With regard to the interregional commodity flows, it could be shown that interregional transportation of grain is unlikely to have decreased significantly, if the figures are corrected for imports and feed use. But a cross-sectional regression analysis using differences between regional production and consumption revealed that regional surpluses as well as deficits for all products tend to diminish, which means that the Russian regions increasingly rely on their regional production and not on interregional trade.
Regulatory Institutions in Agricultural Markets: A Comparative Analysis /доклад на 10 конгрессе ЕААЕ, Exploring Diversity in the European Agri-Food System, Zaragoza, Spain, 28-31 August 2002 [книги]
Опубликовано на портале: 29-11-2003Ann-Christin Sorensen, Berit Tennbakk
We have employed a simple model to analyse market regulation in a situation with multifunctional agricultural production, i.e., a public good produced jointly with a private good, and where there is imperfect competition in processing. We have analysed the impact on welfare of two archetype regulatory institutions formed to overcome the market imperfections. The institutions, a Regulatory Marketing Board and a Regulatory Marketing Cooperative, are both represented in the Norwegian agricultural market. Taking into account the cost of public funds, we find that the Board in general ensures the highest social welfare. The Cooperative does not replicate the Board solution unless restricted by a price cap and in combination with a production subsidy. If the restricted Cooperative is able to practise a higher degree of cost sharing than the Board, it may however produce the highest welfare.