Всего публикаций в данном разделе: 4
Опубликовано на портале: 02-09-2003Torsten Persson, Guido Tabellini
This paper surveys the recent literature on the theory of macroeconomic policy. We study the effect of various incentive constraints on the policy making process, such as lack of credibility, political opportunism, political ideology, and divided government. The survey is organized in three parts. Part I deals with monetary policy in a simply Phillips curve model: it covers credibility issues, political business cycles, and optimal design of monetary institutions. Part II deals with fiscal policy in a dynamic general equilibrium set up: the main topics here are credibility of tax policy, and political determinants of budget deficits. Part III studies economic growth in models with endogenous fiscal policy.
Опубликовано на портале: 01-09-2003Torsten Persson, Guido Tabellini
Observed fiscal policy varies greatly across time and countries. How can we explain this variation across time and countries? This paper surveys the recent literature that has tried to answer this question. We adopt a unified approach in portraying public policy as the equilibrium outcome of an explicitly specified political process. We divide the material into three parts. In Part I, we focus on median-voter equilibria that apply to policy issues where disagreement between voters is likely to be one-dimensional. We thus study the general redistributive programs which are typical of the modern welfare state: redistribution between rich and poor, young and old, employed and unemployed, resident of different regions, and labor and capital. In Part II we study special interest politics. Here the policy problem is multi-dimensional and we focus on specific political mechanisms: we study legislative bargaining, lobbying, and electoral competition, as well as the possible interactions between these different forms of political activity. Finally, Part III deals with a set of questions that can be brought under the label of comparative politics. Here we deal with policy choice under alternative political constitutions; we model the rationale for separation of powers and contrast the stylized features of congressional and parliamentary political systems, focusing on their implications for rent extraction by politicians, redistribution and public goods provision.
Do Budget Rules Work? [книги]
Опубликовано на портале: 01-09-2003James Michael Poterba
The design of budget rules and institutions, long a neglected area in public finance and macroeconomics, has recently been thrust to center stage by the debate over a balanced budget amendment and other deficit-reduction measures in the United States. This paper describes the existing evidence on how budget rules affect fiscal policy outcomes. It contrasts the `institutional irrelevance view,' which holds that budget rules can be circumvented by modifying accounting practices and changing the nominal timing or other classification of taxes and expenditures, with the `public choice view' in which fiscal institutions represent important constraints on the behavior of political actors. Several distinct strands of empirical evidence, from the U.S. federal experience with anti-deficit rules, from U.S. state experience with balanced budget rules, and from international comparisons of budget outcomes in nations with different fiscal institutions, suggest that fiscal institutions do matter. These results reject the institutional irrelevance view. The existing evidence is not refined enough, however, to provide detailed advice on how narrowly-defined changes in budget rules might affect policy outcomes.
Опубликовано на портале: 11-01-2003Andres Velasco, Eric Parrado
Using an optimizing model we derive the optimal monetary and exchange rate policy for a small stochastic open economy with imperfect competition and short run price rigidity. The optimal monetary policy has an exact closed-form solution and is obtained using the utility function of the representative home agent as welfare criterion. The optimal policy depends on the source of stochastic disturbances affecting the economy, much as in the literature pioneered by Poole (1970). Optimal monetary policy reacts to domestic and foreign disturbances. If the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption is less than one, as is likely to be the case empirically, the optimal exchange rate policy implies a dirty float: interest rate shocks from abroad are met partially by adjusting home interest rates, and partially by allowing the exchange rate to move. This optimal pattern may help rationalize the observed fear of floating.