Всего публикаций в данном разделе: 4
Опубликовано на портале: 02-09-2003Guillermo A. Calvo, Carlos A. Vegh
High and persistent inflation has been one of the distinguishing macroeconomic characteristics of many developing countries since the end of World War II. Countries afflicted by chronic inflation, however, have not taken their fate lightly and have engaged in repeated stabilization attempts. More often than not, stabilization plans have failed. The end of stabilizations -- particularly those which rely on a pegged exchange rate -- has often involved dramatic balance of payment crises. As stabilization plans come and go, a large literature has developed trying to document the main empirical regularities and understand the key issues involved. This paper undertakes a critical review and evaluation of the literature related to inflation stabilization policies and balance of payment crises in developing countries.
Chang R. Financial fragility and the exchange rate regime [Текст] / R. Chang, A. Velasco. Cambridge : National Bureau of Economic Research, 1998. 37 p. (NBER working paper series ; 6469). [книга]
Опубликовано на портале: 27-07-2004
Authors study financial fragility, exchange rate crises and monetary policy in an open economy model in which banks are maturity transformers as in Diamond-Dybvig. The banking system, the exchange rate regime, and central bank credit policy are seen as parts of a mechanism intended to maximize social welfare; if the mechanism fails, banking crises and speculative attacks become possible. Authors compare currency boards, fixed rate and flexible rates, with and without a lender of last resort. A currency board cannot implement a socially optimal allocation; in addition, under a currency board bank runs are possible. A fixed exchange rate system may implement the social optimum but is more prone to bank runs and exchange rate crises than a currency board. Larger capital inflows enhance welfare if the no-run equilibrium occurs, but may also render the economy more vulnerable to self-fulfilling runs. A flexible exchange rate system implements the social optimum and eliminates runs, provided the exchange rate and central bank lending policies of the central bank are appropriately designed.
Опубликовано на портале: 11-01-2003Andres Velasco
This paper develops a political-economic model of fiscal policy one in which" government resources are a common property' out of which interest groups can finance" expenditures on their preferred items. This setup has striking macroeconomic implications. First, fiscal deficits and debt accumulation occur even when there are no reasons for intertemporal smoothing. Second deficits can be eliminated through a fiscal reform, but such a reform may only take place after a delay during which government debt is built up.
Опубликовано на портале: 11-01-2003Andres Velasco, Eric Parrado
Using an optimizing model we derive the optimal monetary and exchange rate policy for a small stochastic open economy with imperfect competition and short run price rigidity. The optimal monetary policy has an exact closed-form solution and is obtained using the utility function of the representative home agent as welfare criterion. The optimal policy depends on the source of stochastic disturbances affecting the economy, much as in the literature pioneered by Poole (1970). Optimal monetary policy reacts to domestic and foreign disturbances. If the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption is less than one, as is likely to be the case empirically, the optimal exchange rate policy implies a dirty float: interest rate shocks from abroad are met partially by adjusting home interest rates, and partially by allowing the exchange rate to move. This optimal pattern may help rationalize the observed fear of floating.