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А Б В Г Д Е Ж З И ЙК Л М Н О П Р С Т У Ф Х Ц Ч Ш Щ Э ЮЯ
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W XY Z
 
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все А Б В Г Д Е Ж З И ЙК Л М Н О П Р С Т У Ф Х Ц Ч Ш ЩЭ Ю Я
1 A B C D E F G H I JKL M N O P QR S T UV W XYZ
 

Опубликовано на портале: 31-08-2003
Alan J. Auerbach, Kevin A. Hassett
2003
This paper explores optimal fiscal policy in an overlapping-generations general-equilibrium model under uncertainty and the impact on optimal policy of the introduction of a type of policy stickiness intended to account for the stylized fact that major reforms happen infrequently. In general, our analysis suggests not only that action should not be delayed, but further that action should actually be accelerated. The added realism of restrictions on the frequency of policy changes alters this result in two ways. The prospect of being unable to set policy in the future occasions even more precautionary saving today, if the government acts. However, the government may also choose not to set policy, and its inaction range is very asymmetric. Because the impact of its policies on the current elderly cannot be reversed in the future, the government is much more likely to choose inaction when fiscal tightening is called for. Thus, the optimal policy response over time might best be characterized by great caution in general, but punctuated by occasional periods of apparent irresponsibility.

Опубликовано на портале: 11-11-2004
Willem Hendrik Buiter, Kenneth M. Kletzer
1997
We investigate how the ability of the government to depart from budget balance and issue debt expands the set of equilibria that can be supported using lump-sum tax-transfer investments. We show how this depends on the restrictions that exist on the capacity to tax and make transfer payments, and what these restrictions imply for the government's ability to issue debt.
Central to our analysis is the definition of solvency for an infinite-lived government in an infinite-lived economy with overlapping generations of finite-lived households. Our specification is derived from the demand for public debt by private agents and the non-negativity constraints on the capital stock and on private consumption by all generations. Under fairly tight restrictions on the government's tax-transfer menu, our solvency constraint implies the conventional solvency constraint.
With unrestricted taxes and transfers Ponzi finance is always possible but "inessential": it does not expand the set of equilibria that can be supported. Ponzi finance can be "essential" when taxes and transfers are restricted. The paper establishes a number of results that demonstrate how the government's ability to issue debt allows restricted tax-transfers schemes to support all equilibria attainable using unrestricted taxes and transfers.
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