Всего публикаций в данном разделе: 115
What works in securities laws? [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 06-11-2008Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer Journal of Finance. 2006. Vol. 61. No. 1. P. 1-32 .
We examine the effect of securities laws on stock market development in 49 countries. We find little evidence that public enforcement benefits stock markets, but strong evidence that laws mandating disclosure and facilitating private enforcement through liability rules benefit stock markets.
Understanding regulation [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 06-11-2008Andrei Shleifer European Financial Management. 2005. Vol. 11. No. 4. P. 439-451.
The evolution of common law [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 06-11-2008Nicola Gennaioli, Andrei Shleifer Journal of Political Economy. 2007. Vol. 115. No. 1. P. 43-68.
We present a model of lawmaking by appellate courts in which judges influenced by policy preferences can distinguish precedents at some cost. We find a cost and a benefit of diversity of judicial views. Policy-motivated judges distort the law away from efficiency, but diversity of judicial views also fosters legal evolution and increases the law's precision. We call our central finding the Cardozo theorem: even when judges are motivated by personal agendas, legal evolution is, on average, beneficial because it washes out judicial biases and renders the law more precise. Our paper provides a theoretical foundation for the evolutionary adaptability of common law.
Private credit in 129 countries [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 06-11-2008Simeon Djankov, Caralee McLiesh, Andrei Shleifer Journal of Financial Economics. 2007. Vol. 84. No. 2. P. 299-329 .
We investigate cross-country determinants of private credit, using new data on legal creditor rights and private and public credit registries in 129 countries. Both creditor protection through the legal system and information-sharing institutions are associated with higher ratios of private credit to gross domestic product, but the former is relatively more important in the richer countries. An analysis of legal reforms shows that credit rises after improvements in creditor rights and in information sharing. Creditor rights are remarkably stable over time, contrary to the hypothesis that legal rules are converging. Finally, legal origins are an important determinant of both creditor rights and informationsharing institutions. The analysis suggests that public credit registries, which are primarily a feature of French civil law countries, benefit private credit markets in developing countries.
Government ownership of banks [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 05-11-2008Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer Journal of Finance. 2002. Vol. 57. No. 1. P. 265-301.
We assemble data on government ownership of banks around the world. The data show that such ownership is large and pervasive, and higher in countries with low levels of per capita income, backward financial systems, interventionist and inefficient governments, and poor protection of property rights. Higher government ownership of banks in 1970 is associated with slower subsequent financial development and lower growth of per capita income and productivity. This evidence supports "political" theories of the effects of government ownership of firms.
Опубликовано на портале: 05-11-2008Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny Journal of Finance. 2000. Vol. 55. No. 1. P. 1-33 .
This paper outlines and tests two agency models of dividends. According to the "outcome model," dividends are paid because minority shareholders pressure corporate insiders to disgorge cash. According to the "substitute model," insiders interested in issuing equity in the future pay dividends to establish a reputation for decent treatment of minority shareholders. The first model predicts that stronger minority shareholder rights should be associated with higher dividend payouts; the second model predicts the opposite. Tests on a cross section of 4,000 companies from 33 countries with different levels of minority shareholder rights support the outcome agency model of dividends.
The regulation of entry [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 05-11-2008Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer Quarterly Journal of Economics. 2002. Vol. 117. No. 1. P. 1-37 .
We present new data on the regulation of entry of start-up firms in 85 countries. The data cover the number of procedures, official time, and official cost that a start-up must bear before it can operate legally. The official costs of entry are extremely high in most countries. Countries with heavier regulation of entry have higher corruption and larger unofficial economies, but not better quality of public or private goods. Countries with more democratic and limited governments have lighter regulation of entry. The evidence is inconsistent with public interest theories of regulation, but supports the public choice view that entry regulation benefits politicians and bureaucrats.
The quality of government [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 05-11-2008Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny Journal Of Law, Economics & Organization. 1999. Vol. 15. No. 1. P. 222-279.
We investigate empirically the determinants of the quality of governments in a large cross-section of countries. We assess government performance using measures of government intervention, public sector efficiency, public good provision, size of government, and political freedom. We find that countries that are poor, close to the equator, ethnolinguistically heterogeneous, use French or socialist laws, or have high proportions of Catholics or Muslims exhibit inferior government performance. We also find that the larger governments tend to be the better performing ones. The importance of (reasonably) exogenous historical factors in explaining the variation in government performance across countries sheds light on the economic, political, and cultural theories of institutions.
Do Institutions Cause Growth? [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 05-11-2008Edward Ludwig Glaeser, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer Journal of Economic Growth. 2004. Vol. 9. No. 3. P. 271-303.
We revisit the debate over whether political institutions cause economic growth, or whether, alternatively, growth and human capital accumulation lead to institutional improvement. We find that most indicators of institutional quality used to establish the proposition that institutions cause growth are constructed to be conceptually unsuitable for that purpose. We also find that some of the instrumental variable techniques used in the literature are flawed. Basic OLS results, as well as a variety of additional evidence, suggest that (a) human capital is a more basic source of growth than are the institutions, (b) poor countries get out of poverty through good policies, often pursued by dictators, and (c) subsequently improve their political institutions.
The Regulation of Labor [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 05-11-2008Juan C. Botero, Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer Quarterly Journal of Economics. 2004. Vol. 119. No. 4. P. p1339-1382.
We investigate the regulation of labor markets through employment, collective relations, and social security laws in 85 countries. We find that the political power of the left is associated with more stringent labor regulations and more generous social security systems, and that socialist, French, and Scandinavian legal origin countries have sharply higher levels of labor regulation than do common law countries. However, the effects of legal origins are larger, and explain more of the variation in regulations, than those of politics. Heavier regulation of labor is associated with lower labor force participation and higher unemployment, especially of the young. These results are most naturally consistent with legal theories, according to which countries have pervasive regulatory styles inherited from the transplantation of legal systems.
Опубликовано на портале: 29-10-2008Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer Journal of Financial Economics. 2008. Vol. 88. No. 3. P. 430-465..
We present a new measure of legal protection of minority shareholders against expropriation by corporate insiders: the anti-self-dealing index. Assembled with the help of Lex Mundi law firms, the index is calculated for 72 countries based on legal rules prevailing in 2003, and focuses on private enforcement mechanisms, such as disclosure, approval, and litigation, that govern a specific self-dealing transaction. This theoretically grounded index predicts a variety of stock market outcomes, and generally works better than the previously introduced index of anti-director rights.
Опубликовано на портале: 29-10-2008Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny Journal of Finance. 2002. Vol. 57. No. 3. P. 1147-1170.
We present a model of the effects of legal protection of minority shareholders and of cash-flow ownership by a controlling shareholder on the valuation of firms. We then test this model using a sample of 539 large firms from 27 wealthy economies. Consistent with the model, we find evidence of higher valuation of firms in countries with better protection of minority shareholders and in firms with higher cash-flow ownership by the controlling shareholder.
Law and Finance [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 29-10-2008Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny Journal of Political Economy. 1998. Vol. 106. No. 6. P. 1113-1155.
This paper examines legal rules covering protection of corporate shareholders and creditors, the origin of these rules, and the quality of their enforcement in 49 countries. The results show that common-law countries generally have the strongest, and French-civil-law countries the weakest, legal protections of investors, with German- and Scandinavian-civil-law countries located in the middle. We also find that concentration of ownership of shares in the largest public companies is negatively related to investor protections, consistent with the hypothesis that small, diversified shareholders are unlikely to be important in countries that fail to protect their rights.
Опубликовано на портале: 29-10-2008Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny Journal of Financial Economics. 2000. Vol. 58. No. 1-2. P. 3-27.
Recent research has documented large differences among countries in ownership concentration in publicly traded firms, in the breadth and depth of capital markets, in dividend policies, and in the access of firms to external finance. A common element to the explanations of these differences is how well investors, both shareholders and creditors, are protected by law from expropriation by the managers and controlling shareholders of firms. We describe the differences in laws and the effectiveness of their enforcement across countries, discuss the possible origins of these differences, summarize their consequences, and assess potential strategies of corporate governance reform. We argue that the legal approach is a more fruitful way to understand corporate governance and its reform than the conventional distinction between bank-centered and market-centered financial systems.
Опубликовано на портале: 29-10-2008Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer Journal of Economic Literature. 2008. Vol. 46. No. 2. P. 285-332.
In the last decade, economists have produced a considerable body of research suggesting that the historical origin of a country's laws is highly correlated with a broad range of its legal rules and regulations, as well as with economic outcomes. We summarize this evidence and attempt a unified interpretation. We also address several objections to the empirical claim that legal origins matter. Finally, we assess the implications of this research for economic reform.
The New Comparative Economics [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 29-10-2008Simeon Djankov, Edward Ludwig Glaeser, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer Journal of Comparative Economics. 2003. Vol. 31. No. 4. P. 595-619.
In recent years, the field of comparative economics refocused on the comparison of capitalist economies. The theme of the new research is that institutions exert a profound influence on economic development. We argue that, to understand capitalist institutions, one needs to understand the basic tradeoff between the costs of disorder and those of dictatorship. We apply this logic to study the structure of efficient institutions, the consequences of colonial transplantation, and the politics of institutional choice.
Опубликовано на портале: 27-08-2008Рамиль Наруллович Алимов TERRA ECONOMICUS. 2008. Т. 6. № 1. С. 111-126.
От того, как построена система хозяйственных преступлений, во многом зависит национальная модель развития общества. В работе совмещаются юридические и экономические изыскания.
Опубликовано на портале: 27-07-2007Александр Викторович Шмаков TERRA ECONOMICUS. 2005. Т. 3. № 2. С. 126-131.
В статье проведен экономический анализ уголовного процесса в странах гражданского права. Рассматривается модель, представленная Сайрусом Чу, (Cyrus Chu C.Y. Note. An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Proceedings in Civil-law Countries // International Review of Law and Economics. 1991. V. 11. P. 111–116), в которой анализируется поведение правонарушителя при различных типах уголовных процессов и их влияние на общие социальные издержки.
Корпоративное право и организационный выбор: открытые и закрытые акционерные общества в России [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 23-05-2007Ichiro Iwasaki
В России подавляющее большинство акционерных предприятий является закрытыми обществами (ЗАО), которые во многом не соответствуют исконной сути акционерного общества как современного института мобилизации общественного капитала. Это характерно также для отраслей промышленности и связи. Данная статья, основанная на результатах обследования предприятий, проведенного в первой половине 2005 г. совместной группой японских и российских исследователей, представляет собой попытку теоретического и эмпирического объяснения экономического механизма вышеуказанного явления. В ходе проведенного анализа были обнаружены следующие факторы, предположительно оказывающие значительное влияние на принятие решения о предпочтительности формы ЗАО: а) широкая распространенность структуры собственности с доминирующим положением инсайдеров как следствие массовой приватизации; б) заметное стремление менеджеров к организационной закрытости (closed corporate organization) в условиях неразвитости рынков капитала и менеджеров; в) слабый спрос предприятий на капитал; г) сильная ограниченность ресурсов местных финансовых институтов.
Опубликовано на портале: 16-04-2007Bernard S. Black, Hasung Jang, Woochan Kim ECGI - Finance Working Paper. 2005. No. 87.
This paper contributes to a new literature on the factors that affect firms' corporate governance practices. We find that regulatory factors are highly important, largely because Korean rules impose special governance requirements on large firms (assets > 2 trillion won). Industry factors, firm size, and firm risk are also important. Other firm-specific factors only modestly affect governance even when they are statistically significant. This suggests that many Korean firms do not choose their governance to maximize share price. Among firm-specific factors, the most significant are size (larger firms are better governed) and firm risk (riskier firms are better governed). Long-term averages of profitability and equity finance need are significant, where short-term averages are not. This is consistent with sticky governance, in which firms alter their governance slowly in response to economic factors. In a companion paper, we report evidence that the corporate governance index used here predicts higher share prices for Korean firms. Black, Jang and Kim, Does Corporate Governance Affect Firms' Market Values? Evidence from Korea,: Journal of Law, Economics and Organization (forthcoming 2005), http://ssrn.com/abstract=311275