Всего публикаций в данном разделе: 45
Encyclopedia of Law and Economics: the bibliographical database (based on the bibliographies of the 172 chapters. Over 20,000 references!) [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 14-03-2003Bouckaert Boudewijn, De Geest Gerrit
Детальная библиогафия по праву и экономике.
Annotated Bibliography on Transaction Cost Economics (Theoretical, Empirical, and Institutional Issues) [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 14-03-2003Harvey S. James
Объемная библиография по экономической теории трансакционных издержек, структурно содержащая как журнальные статьи, так и монографии. Наиболее значимые статьи снабжены небольшими аннотациями составителя. Библиография качественно рубрицирована, что только повышает ее ценность для тех, кто связан с изучением исследовательской работой в области теории трансакционных издержек.
Опубликовано на портале: 14-03-2003
Детальная библиография по праву и экономике (статьи). Открытый доступ к оглавнениям журналов по праву и экономике: European Journal of Law and Economics; International Review of Law and Economics; Journal of Law, Economics and Organization и др.
Опубликовано на портале: 25-01-2003Kirsten Foss, Nicolai J. Foss DRUID. 1995. No. 99-4.
Authors discuss the notion of ownership in economics, taking our point of departure in the Grossman-Hart-Moore property rights approach. They criticize the exclusive identification of ownership with residual rights to control in this approach, and argue that economic organization may be rendered determinate under complete contracting (contrary to the GHM approach). Crucially, they argue that under complete contracting, some control rights may be appropriable because of measurement and enforcement costs. This holds the key to a theory of ownership that is not dependent on the notion of residual rights to control, but rather relies on appropriable control rights. However, the two perspectives may be complementary rather than rival.
A Legal Basis for Workers as Agents: Employment Contracts, Common Law, and the Theory of the Firm [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 25-01-2003Harvey S. James University of Missouri-Columbia, Paper Draft. 2001.
The purpose of this paper is to show that the common law governing the employment of labor makes the distinction not only between employee and independent contractor but also between managerial control and agency. The idea is that common law precedents govern workers who are employed and managerially controlled without the requirement that formal, written contracts be established, and that these defaults support the authority of management to direct their activities within the firm. However, many firm owners voluntarily restrict their ability to control workers by making them agents. Workers who are agents differ from workers who are managerially controlled in that in the former caseworkers are treated differently in the eyes of the common law and they often sign detailed, formal employment contracts. The typical features of formal employment contracts are examined. The principal conclusion is that formal employment contracts facilitate the granting of discretion to workers by superseding many of the legal defaults that define the relationship between the worker and firm owner.