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Институциональная экономика (подробнее...)
Всего публикаций в данном разделе: 44

Опубликовано на портале: 06-02-2003
Roland F. Spekle Rotterdam School of Economics Research Papers. 2002.  ERS-2002-06-F&A.
In this paper a theory of management control based on Transaction Cost Economics discusses. This theory specifies the composition of various archetypal control structures, and links these to their respective habitat. These are: (1) arms length control; (2) machine control; (3) exploratory control; and (4) boundary control. The gist of the argument is that activities predictably differ in the control problems to which they give rise, whereas control archetypes differ in their problem-solving ability, and that alignments between the two can be explained by delineating the efficiency properties of the match. This approach has some interesting qualities. Its relatively simple theme seems to speak to a wide empirical domain, and can be used to make sense of a large set of different control practices. Furthermore, it offers a practicable way to address control structure effectiveness. Finally, the approach is empirically testable.
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Опубликовано на портале: 05-02-2003
Nicolai J. Foss DRUID Working Paper. 2002.  No. 02-04.
The role of transaction cost economics in developing research in strategy has been a hotly debated topic over the last decade. This paper presents the radical argument that transaction cost insights are more than merely useful complements to existing approaches to strategy. Rather, they are necessary for adequately understanding the nature of strategizing. This is because transaction costs are essential aspects of processes of creating, capturing and protecting value. If transaction costs are zero, these processes do not pose any strategic problems; strategizing is trivialized in such a world. When transaction costs are positive, on the other hand, opportunities for value creation through the reduction of inefficiencies caused by transaction costs exist, and protecting and appropriating value are costly activities that dissipate value. Also, contracting and expectations enter as central aspects of strategizing. Arguments are provided for why economizing (with transaction costs) is more fundamental than strategizing (in the sense of exploiting market power). Thus, the paper argues that models in which the fullest possible account of transaction costs is made be used as the proper foundations and benchmarks for economics-based strategy research, rather than the patched-up competitive equilibrium models that are now used, more or less implicitly, as the benchmark in important parts of strategy research, most notably in the resource-based view.
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Transaction Costs [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 05-02-2003
Douglas W. Allen Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. 1999. 
This chapter addresses the history, use and significance of the term transaction costs. Few words in the economic language have been more abused or fought over and this is shown to result from the emergence of two distinct definitions and uses. The Neoclassical definition rests on the costs of trading across a market, while the property rights definition centers on the costs of establishing and enforcing property rights. In articulating these two separate definitions and in demonstrating their relationship and separate uses, it is hoped that more progress can be made in the field of transaction cost economics.
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Опубликовано на портале: 05-02-2003
Douglass C. North Economics Working Paper Archive at WUSTL. 1994. 
An economic definition of transaction costs is the costs of measuring what is being exchanged and enforcing agreements. In the larger context of societal evolution they are all the costs involved in human interaction over time. It is this larger context that North explores in this essay. The concept is a close kin to the notion of social capital advanced by James Coleman (1990) and applied imaginatively to studying the differential patterns of Italian regional development by Robert Putnam in Making Democracy Work (1993). This essay, therefore, is a study in economic history which focuses on the costs of human coordination and cooperation through time which I regard as the key dilemma of societies past, present and future.
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