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Shepsle A. Kenneth (Шепсл, Кеннет А.)

Обновлено: 09-12-2010
Образование бакалавр: Mathematics, Political Science [University of North Carolina, 1966]
PhD: Political Science [University of Rochester, 1970]
Место работы Harvard University / Professor of Government, founding member of the Center for Basic Research in the Social Sciences at Harvard

Профессиональные интересы:
  • Formal models of political institutions and intergenerational politics
  • Teaching Interests:
    • Political Economy
    • Political Institutions
    • Positive Political Theory
    • Game Theory in Politics<
    • Congressional and Parliamentary Politics

Последние работы >>

  • with Theodore J. Lowi and Benjamin Ginsberg American Government, 7th (full and core) edition (New York: Norton, 2002).
  • New Institutionalism in American Politics, W.W. Norton, 2000 - .
  • with Mark Bonchek, Analyzing Politics (New York: Norton, 1997)
  • with Michael Laver, Making and Breaking Governments: Cabinets and Legislatures in Parliamentary Democracies (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996) [Winner of Book Award, Political Economy Section, American Political Science Association, 1998]
  • Co-editor with Barry Weingast, Positive Theories of Congressional Institutions (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995) [originally a special issue of Legislative Studies Quarterly, 19 (1994)]
  • Co-editor with Michael Laver, Cabinet Ministers and Parliamentary Government (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994)
  • Models of Multiparty Electoral Competition, a volume in Fundamentals of Pure and Applied Economics, Jacques Lesourne and Hugo Sonnenshein, eds. (London: Harwood Press, 1991).
  • Co-Editor with James Alt, Perspectives on Postive Political Economy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
  • Co-Editor with Peter Ordeshook, Political Equilibrium (Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff, 1982).
  • The Congressional Budget Process: Some Views From the Inside (St. Louis: Center for the Study of American Business, 1980).
  • The Giant Jigsaw Puzzle: Democratic Committee Assignments in the Modern House (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978).
  • with Alvin Rabushka, Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of Democratic Instability (Columbus: Charles Merrill, 1972).

Review of David Brady and Mathew McCubbins, eds., Party, Process, and Political Change in Congress (Stanford, 2002) for Journal of Interdisciplinary History, forthcoming.
Review of Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Predicting Politics (Ohio State, 2002) for Political Science Quarterly, forthcoming.
"Courts, Models, and the New Institutionalism." In J. Bond, R. Flemming, and J. Rogers (eds.) Institutional Games and the U.S.Supreme Court, forthcoming.
"Losers in Politics (and How They Sometimes Become Winners): William Riker's Heresthetic." Perspectives on Politics 1: forthcoming.
"Assessing Comparative Legislative Research." In G. Loewenberg, P. Squire, and R. Kiewiet (eds.) Legislatures (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press), pp. 387-399.
(with Bruce Bueno de Mesquita) "Memoir for William H. Riker." Washington DC: National Academy of Sciences.
(with Eric Dickson) "Working and Shirking: Equilibrium in Public Goods Games with Overlapping Generations of Players." Journal of Law, Economics & Organization 17: 285-318.
"A Comment on Institutional Change." Journal of Theoretical Politics 13: 321-325.
(with Michael Laver) "Ministrables and Government Formation: Munchkins, Players, and Big Beasts of the Jungle." Journal of Theoretical Politics 12: 113-124.
(with John Aldrich) "Explaining Institutional Change: Soaking, Poking, and Modeling in the U. S. Congress." In William Bianco (ed.) Congress on Display, Congress at Work (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press), pp. 23-47.
"The Political Economy of State Reform." Revista De Economia Politica [Brazilian Journal of Political Economy] 19: 39-58.
(with Michael Laver) "How Political Parties Emerged from the Primeval Slime: Party Cohesion, Party Discipline, and the Formation of Governments." In Shaun Bowler and David Farrell (eds.), Party Organization (Columbus: Ohio State University Press), pp. 23-48.
"Game Theory, Structure, and Sequence: The Contributions of Reinhard Selten to Political Analysis." In James Alt, Margaret Levi, and Elinor Ostrom (eds.), Competition and Cooperation: Conversations with Nobelists about Economics and Political Science (New York: Russell Sage), 256-273.
(with Michael Laver) "Government Formation and Survival: A Rejoinder to Warwick's Reply." British Journal of Political Science 29: 412-415.
(with Michael Laver) "Understanding Government Survival: Empirical Exploration or Analytical Models?" British Journal of Political Science 29: 395-401.
(with Michael Laver) "Government Accountability in Parliamentary Democracy," in Adam Przeworski, Susan Stokes, and Pierre Manin (eds.), Democracy, Accountability, and Representation, (New York: Cambridge University Press), pp. 279-297.
(with Michael Laver) "Events, Equilibria, and Government Survival," American Journal of Political Science 42: 28-55.
(with James Alt) "Rules, Restrictions, Constraints: Structure and Process in the New Institutional Economics." Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 154: 735-44.

Подробнее см.>>

Публикации на портале:
Домашняя страница http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~kshepsle
E-mail kshepsle@latte.harvard.edu
Телефон 617-495-4928
Факс 617-496-5149
Адрес Office Address:
Center for Basic Research in the Social Sciences (CBRSS), Harvard University,
34 Kirkland Street, Cambridge, MA 02138

Ключевые слова

См. также:
Torsten Persson, David Stromberg
[Учебная программа]
Rick Ogmundson
American Sociological Review. 1975.  Vol. 40. No. 4. P. 506-512. 
Jefferey M. Sellers
[Учебная программа]
Kenneth Andrews
[Учебная программа]