Эксоцман
на главную поиск contacts

Endogenous Political Institutions

Опубликовано на портале: 07-10-2003
NBER Working Paper Series. 2002.  No. 9006.
Цель работы состоит в выявлении ряда характеристик общества, определяющих его эндогенный выбор политических институтов. В контексте риска «тирании большинства» авторы анализируют оптимальное конституционное устройство, обеспечивающее для меньшинства возможность блокировать законы.

Political institutions influence economic policy, but they are themselves endogenous since they are chosen, in some way, by members of the polity. An important aspect of institutional design is how much society chooses to delegate unchecked power to its leaders. If, once elected, a leader cannot be restrained, society runs the risk of a tyranny of the majority, if not the tyranny of a dictator. If a leader faces too many ex post checks and balances, legislative action is too often blocked. As our critical constitutional choice we focus upon the size of the minority needed to block legislation, or conversely the size of the (super) majority needed to govern. We analyze both "optimal" constitutional design and "positive" aspects of this process. We derive several empirical implications which we then discuss.

Ссылки
представлена в сборнике NBER Working Papers. Полный текст представлен на странице,
этой статье, в формате pdf:
http://www.nber.org/papers/w9006
BiBTeX
RIS
Ключевые слова

См. также:
James I. Sturgeon
[Учебная программа]
Philippe Aghion, Oliver Hart, John Moore
NBER Working Paper Series. 1992.  No. 4097.
[Статья]
Avner Greif
SSRN Working Papers. 1996.  No. 9611132.
[Статья]
Elinor Ostrom, Charlotte Hess
[Статья]