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Efficiency Properties of Strategic Market Games: An Axiomatic Approach

Опубликовано на портале: 01-09-2003
Тематический раздел:
The paper investigates the conditions under which an abstractly given market game will have the property that if there is a continuum of traders then every noncooperative equilibrium is Walrasian. In other words, we look for a general axiomatization of Cournots well-known result. Besides, some convexity, continuity, and nondegeneracy hypothesis, the crucial axioms are: anonymity (i.e., the names of traders are irrelevant to the market) and aggregation (i.e. the net trade received by a trader depends only on his own action and the mean action of all traders). It is also shown that the same axioms do not guarantee efficiency is there is only a finite number of traders. Some examples are discussed and a notion of strict noncooperative equilibrium for anonymous games is introduced.