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Adverse Selection, Short-term Contracting, and the Under-provision of On-the-job Training

Опубликовано на портале: 03-05-2005
Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy. 2002.  Vol. 1. No. 1. P. 1005-1028. 
This article argues that the existence of adverse selection (worker heterogeneity) can explain the underprovision of general training by employers. High-ability workers value the option to entertain outside wage offers once their abilty becomes known to the market. Offering short-term contracts is, therefore, a way to screen high-ability types from low-ability types. A firm is not willing to train workers under short-term contracts. Hence, despite the positive returns to training, training may be underprovided in equilibrium. More generally, this article contributes to the literature that seeks to explain the puzzling phenomenon of short-term contracts governing long-term buyer-seller relationships.

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текст статьи в формате pdf на сайте Haas School of Business, University of California:
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/hermalin/adverse2.pdf
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