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Capital Structure, Management Ownership and Large External Shareholders: A UK Analysis

Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006
International Journal of the Economics of Business. 2002.  Vol. 9. No. 3. P. 375-399. 
This paper examines empirically the effects of management ownership and ownership by large external shareholders on the capital structure of the firm from an agency theory perspective. The paper extends the US literature on the topic by examining the effect of interactions between management ownership and ownership by large external shareholders on the capital structure of UK firms. For a sample of UK firms, the paper provides empirical evidence that suggests the debt ratio is positively related to management ownership and negatively related to ownership by large external shareholders. Furthermore, the presence of a large external shareholder acts to negate the positive relationship between debt ratios and management ownership; in the presence of a large external shareholder, no significant relationship between debt ratios and management ownership exists. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that the presence of large external shareholders affects the agency costs of debt and equity.

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