на главную поиск contacts

A Model of the IMF as a Coinsurance Arrangement

Опубликовано на портале: 03-12-2007
Discussion Paper. 2007.  No. 2007-26.
The paper shows that an IMF-like coinsurance arrangement among countries can play a useful role in the global financial system. The operation of the coinsurance arrangement is examined under different loan contracts. It shows that, if the IMFґs objective is to safeguard its resources and be concerned about the welfare of the borrower, an ex ante loan contract is more likely to create the right incentives than an ex post loan contract. Such contracts highlight the need for precommitment to contend with the Samaritanґs dilemma and time inconsistency, and state-contingent repayment schemes to deal with King Learґs dilemma.

Ключевые слова

См. также:
Martin Dufwenbergy, Michael Lundholmz
The Economic Journal. 2001.  No. 111. P. 506-526. 
Andreu Mas-Colell, Michael D. Whinston, Jerry Richard Green
Nicolai J. Foss, Henrik Lando, Steen Thomsen
Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. 1999. 
Robin W. Boadway, Manuel Leite-Monteiro, Maurice Marchand, Pierre Pestieau
Luis M B Cabral, Ali Hortaçsu
NBER Working Paper. 2007.  No. 10363.
Graham Hacche
World Economics Journal. 2007.  Vol. 8. No. 2. P. 97-118.