на главную поиск contacts

Games of Monetary and Fiscal Interactions in the EMU

Опубликовано на портале: 21-10-2007
European Economic Review. 2001.  Vol. 45. No. 4-6. P. 589-613. 
This paper constructs various models of the EMU and ECB when member countries have different objectives. Voting in pursuit of national interest can yield moderate and stable inflation. The metaphor of Walsh-type contracts implements a monetary policy rule that averages the member countries' most preferred rules. In a repeated relationship where a country suffering a large adverse shock can use political bargaining to subvert the ECB's commitment, the optimal rule should incorporate some flexibility to forestall that. Finally, freedom of national fiscal policies undermines the ECB's monetary commitment; this may justify fiscal constraints like the Stability and Growth Pact.

Аннотация статьи представлена на сайте ScienceDirect. Полный текст статьи находится в закрытом доступе
Ключевые слова

См. также:
Avinash K. Dixit, Luisa Lambertini
Journal of International Economics. 2003.  Vol. 60. No. 2. P. 235-247. 
Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, Debora Di Gioacchino
Working Paper (University of Rome "La Sapienza"). 2004.  No. 74.
Zeno Rotondi, Glacomo Vaciago
Universita Cattolica del Sacro Cuore di Milano Working Papers. 2002.  No. 46.
Cindy Moons, Harry Garretsen, Bas van Aarle, Jorge Fornero
Journal of Policy Modeling. 2007.  Vol. 29. No. 6. P. 879-902. 
Andrew Hughes Hallett, Diana Weymark
CEPR Discussion Papers. 2002.  No. 3336.
Roel M.W.J. Beetsma, Lans Arij Bovenberg
European Journal of Political Economy. 2003.  Vol. 19. No. 1. P. 1-15.