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Fiscal-Monetary Policy Coordination and Debt Management: A Two Stage Dynamic Analysis

Опубликовано на портале: 25-10-2007
Working Paper (University of Rome "La Sapienza"). 2004.  No. 74.
This paper studies the interaction between two autonomous policymakers, the central bank and the government, in managing public debt as the result of a two-stage game. In the first stage the institutional regime is established. This determines the equilibrium solution to be applied in the second stage, in which a differential game is played between the two policymakers. It is shown that, if the policymakers can communicate before the game is played, (multiple-equilibrium) coordination problems can be solved by using the concept of correlated equilibrium. Unlike Nash equilibrium, which only allows for individualistic and independent behavior, a correlated equilibrium allows for the players’ behavior to be coordinated and correlated.

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