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Family firms

Опубликовано на портале: 06-11-2008
Journal of Finance. 2003.  Vol. 58. No. 5. P. 2167-2201 . 
We present a model of succession in a firm owned and managed by its founder. The founder decides between hiring a professional manager or leaving management to his heir, as well as on what fraction of the company to float on the stock exchange. We assume that a professional is a better manager than the heir, and describe how the founder's decision is shaped by the legal environment. This theory of separation of ownership from management includes the Anglo-Saxon and the Continental European patterns of corporate governance as special cases, and generates additional empirical predictions consistent with cross-country evidence.

Ссылки
http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/files/FamilyFirms.pdf
http://www.econ.upf.edu/~penalva/seminar/02_2Spring/panunzi.pdf
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