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Democracy, Accountability, and Representation

Опубликовано на портале: 12-12-2003
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999, 361 с.
This book examines whether the mechanisms of accountability characteristic of democratic systems are sufficient to induce the representatives to act in the best interest of the represented. The first part of the volume focuses on the role of elections, distinguishing different ways in which they may cause representation. The second part is devoted to the role of checks and balances, between the government and the parliament as well as between the government and the bureaucracy. The contributors of this volume, all leading scholars in the fields of American and comparative politics and political theory, address questions such as, whether elections induce governments to act in the interest of citizens. Are politicians in democracies accountable to voters in future elections? If so, does accountability induce politicians to represent citizens? Does accountability limit or enhance the scope of action of governments? Are governments that violate campaign mandates representative? Overall, the essays combine theoretical discussions, game-theoretic models, case studies, and statistical analyses, within a shared analytical approach and a standardized terminology. The empirical material is drawn from the well established democracies as well as from new democracies.

Is economic development conducive to political democracy? Does democracy foster or hinder material welfare? These two questions are examined by looking at the experiences of 135 countries between 1950 and 1990. Descriptive information, statistical analyses, and historical narratives are interwoven to gain an understanding of the dynamic of political regimes and their impact on economic development. The often surprising findings dispel any notion of a tradeoff between democracy and development. Economic development does not generate democracies, but democracies are much more likely to survive in wealthy societies.

Текст первого параграфа Elections and representation авторов Bernard Manin, Adam Przeworski and Susan C. Stokes.
Introduction Bernard Manin, Adam Przeworski and Susan C. Stokes;

Part I. Elections, Accountability, and Representation:
1.Elections and representation Bernard Manin, Adam Przeworski and Susan C. Stokes;
2. Electorial accountability and the control of politicians: selecting good types versus sanctioning poor performance;
3. What do policy switches tell us about democracy? Susan C. Stokes;
4. Accountability and authority: toward a theory of political accountability John Ferejohn;
5. Accountability and manipulation José María Maravall;
6. Party government and responsiveness James A. Stimson;
7. Democracy, elections, and accountability for economic outcomes José Antonio Cheibub and Adam Przeworski;

Part II. The Structure of Government and Accountability:
8. Accountability in Athenian politics Jon Elster;
9. Government accountability in parliamentary democracy Michael Laver and Kenneth A. Shepsle;
10. Mixing elected and non-elected officials in democratic policy making: fundamentals of accountability and responsibility Delmer D. Dunn;

Part III. Situating Democratic Political Accountability John Dunn.

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