The Economics of Transaction Costs (Elgar Critical Writings Reader)
Опубликовано на портале: 22-09-2003
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1999, 560 с.
This paperback reader for students and scholars presents, in a convenient and accessible form, the articles which together form the foundations of research in transaction cost economics. The volume is divided into three parts: the first part presents the background to the field and includes those path-breaking papers from Coase (1937 and 1972), Williamson (1971) and Alchian and Demsetz (1972). The second part addresses the apparatus of transaction cost economics and includes papers on the structure and limits of firms. The third part presents the applications of transaction cost economics to firm behavior, investment decision-making, contract bidding, regulation and legislation.
Transaction cost economics began to take shape around thirty years ago and has since been established as an essential tool used to illuminate a wide range of problems in economics and other social sciences. This paperback reader for students and scholars presents, in a convenient and accessible form, the articles which together form the foundations of research in transaction cost economics. The volume is divided into three parts: the first part presents the background to the field and includes those path-breaking papers from Coase (1937 and 1972), Williamson (1971) and Alchian and Demsetz (1972). The second part addresses the apparatus of transaction cost economics and includes papers on the structure and limits of firms. The third part presents the applications of transaction cost economics to firm behavior, investment decision-making, contract bidding, regulation and legislation. The editors, themselves distinguished scholars in the field, have written a new introduction which sketches the history of research in the field and offers some thoughts about the future of transaction cost economics.
Introduction Oliver E. Williamson and Scott E. Mastenix
PART I BACKGROUND
1. R.H. Coase (1937), "The Nature of the Firm', Economica, IV, November, 386-4053
2. Oliver E. Williamson (1971), 'The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations', American EconomicReview, LXI (2), May, 112-2323
3. Armen A. Alchian and Harold Demsetz (1972), 'Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization', American Economic Review, LXII, December, 777-9535
4. R.H. Coase (1972), 'Industrial Organization: A Proposal for Research', in Victor R. Fuchs (ed.), Policy Issues and Research Opportunities in Industrial Organization, New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 59-7354
PART II APPARATUS
5. Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford and Armen A. Alchian (1978), 'Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process', Journal of Law and Economics, XXI (2), October, 297-32671
6. Oliver E. Williamson (1991), 'Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives', Administrative Science Quarterly, 36 (2), June, 269-96101
7. Oliver E. Williamson (1983), 'Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange', American Economic Review, 73 (4), September, 519-40129
8. Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart (1986), 'The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration', Journal of Political Economy, 94 (4), August, 691-719 151
9. Oliver E.Williamson (1985), "The Limits of Firms: Incentive and Bureaucratic Features', in Oliver E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, Chapter 6, New York: Free Press, 131-62 and references180
10. Bengt Holmstrom and Paul Milgrom (1991), 'Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 7, Special Issue, 24-52214
PART III APPLICATIONS
11. Erin Anderson and David C. Schmittlein (1984), 'Integration of the Sales Force: An Empirical Examination', Rand Journal of Economics, 15 (3), Autumn, 385-95245
12. Scott E. Masten, James W. Meehan, Jr. and Edward A. Snyder (1991), "The Costs of Organization', Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 7 (1), Spring, 1-25256
13. Paul L. Joskow (1987), 'Contract Duration and Relationship-Specific Investments: Empirical Evidence from Coal Markets', American Economic Review, 77 (1), March, 168-85281
14. Bruce R. Lyons (1994), 'Contracts and Specific Investment: An Empirical Test of Transaction Cost Theory', Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 3 (2), Summer, 257-78299
15. Victor P. Goldberg and John R. Erickson (1987), 'Quantity and Price Adjustment in Long-Term Contracts: A Case Study of Petroleum Coke', Journal of Law and Economics, XXX (2), October, 369-98321
16. Scott E. Masten and Keith J. Crocker (1985), 'Efficient Adaptation in Long-Term Contracts: Take-or-Pay Provisions for Natural Gas', American Economic Review, 75 (5), December, 1083-93351
17. Roy W. Kenney and Benjamin Klein (1983), "The Economics of Block Booking', Journal of Law and Economics, XXVI (3), October, 497-540362
18. Oliver E. Williamson (1976), 'Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies - in General and with Respect to CATV', Bell Journal of Economics, 7 (1), Spring, 73-104406
19. Victor P. Goldberg (1976), 'Regulation and Administered Contracts', Bell Journal of Economics, 7 (2), Autumn, 426-48438
20. Brian Levy and Pablo T. Spiller (1994), 'The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation', Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 10 (2), Fall, 201-46461
21. Barry R. Weingast and William J. Marshall (1988), 'The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets', Journal of Political Economy, 96 (1), 132-63498
contract bidding investment decision-making limits of firms structure of firms transaction cost economics
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