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Labour Unions, Public Policy and Economic Growth

Опубликовано на портале: 25-01-2003
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000
Collective bargaining is still the main vehicle for labour worldwide to negotiate wages, benefits, retirement policies, training and other terms of working with management in both the public and private sectors. Labour economists have long been active in modelling the relations between collective bargaining agreements, labour markets, and social welfare conditions. This book presents a new theoretical model of unions which offers a unified treatment of the centralization of bargaining, the credibility of labour contracts, the unionization of labour markets and the relative bargaining power of the union. Part I of the book develops the microfoundations of bargaining and examines collective bargaining interacting with public policy, investment and growth, and international trade and specialization. In conclusion Professor Palokangas challenges the commonly held view that collective bargaining has a negative impact on economics welfare, and argues that with the existence of market failure, collective bargaining can be welfare enhancing.

1. Basic concept of game theory
2. Collective bargaining without investment
3. The use of corrective taxes and subsidies
4. Taxation and production efficiency
5. Credibility in collective bargaining
6. Monopoly unions and sluggish investment
7. Ordinary wages vs. profit-sharing
8. Unions and economic growth
9. Unions and international specialization

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См. также:
Robert E. Lucas
Gregory N. Mankiw
Paul A. David, John Gabriel Goddard Lopez
Treasury Working Papers. 2003.  No. 01/13.
Angus Maddison
Sergio Rebelo
Journal of Political Economy. 1991.  Vol. 99. No. 3. P. 500-521.