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Статичное равновесие Курно – Нэша и рефлексивные игры олигополии: случай линейных функций спроса и издержек

русская версия

Опубликовано на портале: 31-12-2010
Экономический журнал ВШЭ. 2006.  Т. 10. № 1. С. 3-32. 
Тематический раздел:
A problem of static oligopoly equilibria is studied with using non-cooperativestatic n-person game and strategic reflective games in a class of linear functions ofdemand and cost. There are introduced a concept of firm’s competitiveness in Cournot–Nash equilibrium, a notion of conjectural variations as a first derivatives ofStackelberg curves, and a notion of sequentially-grouped order game. Bresnahan'sproposition (1981) about inconsistency of Cournot’s conjectures are analyzed and refuted.The propositions in the papers by Bergstrom and Varian (1985), and Novshek(1985) are corrected with using of the concept of firm’s competitiveness. The statictask has been solved and à convergence of strategic reflective game processes toCournot – Nash equilibrium has been analyzed. A process of a sequential game converges,independently of number of uncompetitive firms. A process of a simultaneousgame will diverge if number of firms is more than 2; otherwise a process willconverge to Cournot – Nash equilibrium. A process of sequentially-grouped ordergame depends on initial choice of firms and a distribution of competitive firmsamong the groups; the process may be cyclical or converges; except when no morethen two firms are in the groups and the process will converge.
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