TY - JOUR
TI - Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete
Information
T2 - Econometrica
IS - 3
KW - folk theorem
KW - repeated game
KW - игры с неполной информацией
KW - математическое моделирование
KW - повторяющиеся игры
KW - теория игр
KW - экономическое поведение
AB - When either there are only two players or a "full dimensionality"
condition holds, any individually rational payoff vector of a
one-shot game of complete information can arise in a perfect
equilibrium of the infinitely-repeated game if players are
sufficiently patient. In contrast to earlier work, mixed strategies
are allowed in determining the individually rational payoffs (even
when only realized actions are observable). Any individually rational
payoffs of a one-shot game can be approximated by sequential
equilibrium payoffs of a long but finite game of incomplete
information, where players' payoffs are almost certainly as in the
one-shot game.
AU - Fudenberg, Drew
AU - Maskin, Eric S.
UR - http://ecsocman.hse.ru/text/18925163/
PY - 1986
SP - 533-554
M2 - 533
VL - 54
SN -
N1 -
LA - EN
CY -
PB -
M3 -
LB -
VL -
ER -