@ARTICLE{19000108_1993,
author = {Ray, Debraj and Chatterjee, Kaljan and Sengupta, Kunal and Dutta, Bhaskar},
keywords = {bargaining, задача с торгом, игры n лиц, игры с торгом, математическое моделирование, некооперативные игры, теория некооперативных игр, экономическое поведение},
title = {A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining},
journal = {Review of Economic Studies},
year = {1993},
month = {},
volume = {60},
number = {2},
pages = {463-77},
url = {http://ecsocman.hse.ru/text/19000108/},
publisher = {},
language = {ru},
abstract = {The authors explore a sequential offers model of n-person coalitional
bargaining with transferable utility and with time discounting. Their
focus is on the efficiency properties of stationary equilibria of
strictly superadditive games when the discount factor 'delta' is
sufficiently large. It is shown that delay and the formation of
inefficient subcoalitions can occur in equilibrium, the latter for
some or all orders of proposer. However, efficient stationary
equilibrium payoffs converge to a point in the core as 'delta'
approaches one. Strict convexity is a sufficient condition for there
to exist an efficient stationary equilibrium payoff vector for
sufficiently high 'delta'. },
annote = {The authors explore a sequential offers model of n-person coalitional
bargaining with transferable utility and with time discounting. Their
focus is on the efficiency properties of stationary equilibria of
strictly superadditive games when the discount factor 'delta' is
sufficiently large. It is shown that delay and the formation of
inefficient subcoalitions can occur in equilibrium, the latter for
some or all orders of proposer. However, efficient stationary
equilibrium payoffs converge to a point in the core as 'delta'
approaches one. Strict convexity is a sufficient condition for there
to exist an efficient stationary equilibrium payoff vector for
sufficiently high 'delta'. }
}