@ARTICLE{19128884_1999,
author = {Maskin, Eric S.},
keywords = {Nash equilibrium, social welfare, благосостояние населения, математическое моделирование, общественное благосостояние, равновесие по Нэшу, социальное благосостояние, экономическое поведение},
title = {Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality},
journal = {Review of Economic Studies},
year = {1999},
month = {},
volume = {66},
number = {1},
pages = {23-38},
url = {http://ecsocman.hse.ru/text/19128884/},
publisher = {},
language = {ru},
abstract = {If is a set of social alternatives, a social choice rule (SCR)
assigns a subset of A to each potential profile of individuals'
preferences over A, where the subset is interpreted as the set of
'welfare optima.' A game form (or 'mechanism') implements the social
choice rule if, for any potential profile of preferences, (1) any
welfare optimum can arise as a Nash equilibrium of the game form
(implying, in particular, that a Nash equilibrium exists) and, (2)
all Nash equilibria are welfare optimal. The main result of this
paper establishes that any SCR that satisfies two properties -
monotonicity and no veto power--can be implemented by a game form if
there are three or more individuals. The proof is constructive. },
annote = {If is a set of social alternatives, a social choice rule (SCR)
assigns a subset of A to each potential profile of individuals'
preferences over A, where the subset is interpreted as the set of
'welfare optima.' A game form (or 'mechanism') implements the social
choice rule if, for any potential profile of preferences, (1) any
welfare optimum can arise as a Nash equilibrium of the game form
(implying, in particular, that a Nash equilibrium exists) and, (2)
all Nash equilibria are welfare optimal. The main result of this
paper establishes that any SCR that satisfies two properties -
monotonicity and no veto power--can be implemented by a game form if
there are three or more individuals. The proof is constructive. }
}